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ABSTRACT 
 Sub-Saharan African countries with established space programs have pursued a 
variety of different space policies, some focusing on national security, some focusing on 
socioeconomic development, or some on a mix of the two. Which factors—foreign 
partners, domestic politics, bureaucratic institutions, or economic capacity—are the 
strongest drivers of these policy decisions in African space programs? This thesis uses a 
qualitative case study analysis of the two most advanced space programs in sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Africa and Nigeria, to address the research question. Each case study 
provides a brief history of the country’s space program before analyzing the roles each 
factor plays in space policy decisions. In both South Africa and Nigeria, only domestic 
political priorities had a strong impact on the space programs’ trajectories, while the 
remaining factors exhibited either weak influence or no influence. The strength of the 
political priorities hypothesis suggests a high-degree of political agency and national 
pride in each country’s space program, which contrasts with typical “Afro-pessimist” 
approaches to African studies. If U.S. leaders desire to improve geopolitical relationships 
with strategic partners in Africa, thereby counterbalancing great power competition on 
the continent, the U.S. should assist African countries in implementing their political 
priorities by increasing space cooperation with African countries across the commercial, 
civil, and military sectors. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
From science fiction to scientific journal articles, outer space is represented as 
humanity's final frontier. Space is an incredibly inhospitable environment with a plethora 
of hazards to both humans and spacecraft, including high radiation, extreme thermal 
variations, potential high-speed collisions, solar flares, microgravity, and almost no 
atmospheric pressure. Furthermore, rocket launches to orbit are jarring and expensive, even 
with the recent emergence of commercial rocket reusability. With the many challenges and 
risks that space presents, why would a developing country, with earthlier domestic and 
international concerns, commit scarce capital and resources towards creating space 
capacity and institutions?  
Sub-Saharan Africa is widely recognized as a region with many developing 
countries that face countless obstacles. Fewer people realize that sub-Saharan Africa has 
an emerging space sector with a growing number of emerging space actors (EMSAs).1 
These EMSAs appear to create varied space programs, with some countries developing 
space programs to advance their national security goals while others pursue programs 
geared toward socioeconomic development. This thesis addresses why EMSAs in Africa 
have pursued different space policies, focusing on security, development, or some mix of 
the two. It also examines the foreign partnerships involved in different types of African 
space programs and the implications of these partnerships for influencing space policy.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
African space programs are rapidly expanding in scope and number. Every African 
country is now “involved in at least some capacity in the space sector, apart from being a 
user of space data.”2 The level of involvement greatly varies between countries. Fourteen 
                                                 
1 Hereafter, I will use “Africa” to mean “sub-Saharan Africa” for the sake of concision.  
2 Annette Froehlich and André Siebrits, Space Supporting Africa: A Primary Needs Approach and 
Africa’s Emerging Space Middle Powers (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 
145, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12173-0. 
2 
countries in Africa have an emerging space program in the form of ground facilities or 
satellites.3 The remaining countries in Africa have not developed space technology but are 
involved in intergovernmental organizations or interact with non-governmental 
organizations focused on space programs.4 In short, Africa is experiencing a surge in space 
activity. 
The growth in African EMSAs presents both an opportunity and threat to U.S. 
global interests. EMSAs present opportunities because they almost always need partners 
to develop space technology and access space.5 The U.S. might be able to strengthen 
partnerships with African countries by supporting their emerging space programs. On the 
other hand, U.S. interests could be threatened if EMSAs partner with countries seeking to 
limit U.S. power. For example, orbital trajectories, with the exception of geostationary 
equatorial orbit (GEO), eventually pass over all of Earth’s longitudes, allowing military or 
dual-use satellites to collect information on U.S. national security interests globally. By 
understanding what factors influence the objectives of an African EMSA’s space policies, 
the U.S. can identify potential partners and position itself to respond to future threats. With 
the growth in African EMSAs and great power competition (GPC) in Africa, this research 
is more relevant than ever.  
This thesis also contributes to the theoretical understanding of African countries. 
There are not currently many tools to comprehend African governments’ actions in the 
space sector, so there is abundant room for growth in this field. Understanding the factors 
that influence African space policy will further illuminate the behavior of African 
governments in their broader development and security programming. Furthermore, 
African space studies are especially interesting because the space sector is a potential point 
of national pride, which contrasts to common development concerns like poverty, food, 
                                                 
3 Samuel Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” Astropolitics 15, no. 2 (May 2017): 
190–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/14777622.2017.1339254. 
4 Froehlich and Siebrits, Space Supporting Africa, 144–45. 
5 Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing 
Countries: The Space Technology Ladder,” Space Policy 28, no. 1 (February 2012): 21–22, https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.11.001. 
3 
and ungoverned spaces. Exploring an optimistic topic like space challenges common 
“Afropessimist” approaches to African studies. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The context in which African countries are developing their space programs today 
is considerably different from that in which more advanced space programs came about. 
Whereas the Cold War gave rise to a generation of space programs focused largely on the 
competitive pursuit of international power, there is now increasing importance on access 
to space for both national security and socioeconomic development.6 The space policy 
goals of most EMSAs fall on a spectrum between these security or development 
objectives.7 This research examines the motivations of EMSAs in Africa, and discovers 
what factors are most important in a country’s decision to favor either security or 
development in their nascent space programs.  
EMSAs in Africa are exclusively what Harding classifies as second- or third-tier 
space actors, which means they rely on international collaboration in varying degrees to 
accomplish their space objectives.8 As African countries look to develop space capacity, 
they invest primarily in satellite programs and ground facilities, with several additional 
small sounding rocket programs.9 Host governments fully fund about 62% of these space 
programs, while private investors and external partners work with African countries to fund 
                                                 
6 Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and Development 
on the Final Frontier (New York: Routledge, 2013), 29–30, 71. 
7 For example, the subtitle of Harding’s book emphasizes the importance of security and development 
as the primary policy goals for space programs in developing countries. Harding, Space Policy in 
Developing Countries. 
8 Harding categorizes EMSAs into three groups: (1) first-tier EMSAs are the most advanced programs, 
with autonomous production, independent launch capacity, national space agencies, and a space history 
predominantly focused on ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons; (2) second-tier EMSAs have semi-
independent technology production with international collaboration, basic rocketry capabilities, and 
national space agencies; and (3) third-tier EMSAs invest in space capacity by purchasing space technology, 
cooperating with more advanced space states, and, sometimes, making independent space contributions. 
Froehlich and Siebrits, Space Supporting Africa, 268–69; and Harding, Space Policy in Developing 
Countries, 78–79. 
9 Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 193–94. 
4 
the remaining projects.10 Like other EMSAs, African countries use these space 
investments to solve countless security and development problems.  
1. The Security-Development Space Policy Decision 
Most of the existing literature on EMSAs focuses on why developing countries 
choose to develop a space program at all. Fewer studies address why EMSAs adopt 
different types of space policies. Nonetheless, this discussion draws on existing literature 
to highlight key factors driving space policy choices of EMSAs, and discusses how these 
explanations may or may not apply to African countries in establishing security- or 
development-focused space programs. I examine four broad groupings of factors: 
international relations, political priorities, bureaucratic institutions, and economic capacity.  
From the international relations perspective, many EMSAs are dependent on 
international partners with more advanced space programs. In their study of space 
technology for eight EMSAs, for example, Wood and Weigel discover that all eight 
countries used international partnerships to help advance their space programs, and only 
one country has the technological capacity to independently launch to GEO.11 EMSAs, 
therefore, broadly depend on international partnerships to access the benefits of space. It 
follows that the availability of space partners is likely to shape a country’s space policy.  
Another strand of the international relations perspective focuses on the extent to 
which a conflictual or cooperative international context shapes emerging space programs. 
For example, during the Cold War, the conflictual environment led to a security-focused 
space race aimed at international power between the U.S. and USSR.12 In the post-Cold 
War era, where international cooperation is more common, space programs have focused 
to a larger extent on socioeconomic development.13 This does not indicate that competition 
                                                 
10 Oyewole, 194–95. 
11 Wood and Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing Countries,” 21–22. 
12 Giorgio Petroni and Davide Gianluca Bianchi, “New Patterns of Space Policy in the Post-Cold War 
World,” Space Policy 37, no. 1 (August 2016): 12–13, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2016.10.002. 
13 Petroni and Bianchi, 13; and Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 196. 
5 
in the space domain has disappeared after the Cold War, but rather, that the dominance of 
the conflictual environment has waned.14 Development objectives have become a new 
focus of cooperation, especially in the economic, political, and institutional domains, but 
military cooperation, through alliances with more advanced space countries, remains an 
important influence on space policy for EMSAs.15 Thus, the broad nature of the 
international environment matters for understanding how EMSAs’ develop their domestic 
space programs. 
As the last element of the international relations perspective, Froehlich and Siebrits 
assert that an African EMSA’s status as an “emerging middle power” shapes space policy 
decisions. They define an emerging middle power as a state with medium global 
international power, but regional dominance, and offer South Africa and Nigeria as primary 
examples.16 Froehlich and Siebrits expect that emerging middle powers will behave in 
ways that support the existing international order, maintain their regional privilege within 
the system, avoid threats to global powers, facilitate regional cooperation, and solidify their 
position as a broker between global powers and regional states.17 Put simply, the emerging 
middle powers argument expects African EMSAs to conform to international space laws 
and norms. Although this argument may help explain how African EMSAs interact with 
international space fora, it is not a useful explanation for influences on African security-
development decisions in the space sector since international space institutions permit a 
wide variety of both security and development space applications.  
A country’s political priorities also shape its space program. Harding argues that 
“states have traditionally structured national space policies in ways that are not at all unlike 
                                                 
14 As an example of a post-Cold War conflictual environment, Moltz finds that competition for space 
capacity is strong in Asia, which creates security-focused space policies. James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space 
Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2012). 
15 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 
(Spring 1998): 32, https://doi.org/10.2307/1149275; and Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 
196. 
16 Froehlich and Siebrits, Space Supporting Africa, 73. 
17 Froehlich and Siebrits, 73–75. 
6 
their terrestrial national security and development priorities.”18 Many EMSAs create space 
policies that utilize satellite technology to gain information for both national security and 
socioeconomic development, which creates tangible political benefits.19 For example, 
satellite imagery can support national security objectives by tracking adversary force 
movement, while also contributing to development by providing information on crop 
yields.20 The imagery provides information that politicians use to make more informed 
decisions about both security and development problems. In other words, space policy 
mirrors a country’s political priorities because of the real benefits that space technology 
can deliver to help achieve political objectives. 
Several studies have focused on the role of bureaucratic institutions in shaping 
emerging space programs. Both Moltz and Martinez offer complementary examples of 
bureaucratic cooperation and its effects on space programs. Moltz finds that internal 
organizational competition over space priorities has slowed Brazil’s space progression.21 
Likewise, Martinez cites broad bureaucratic cooperation as the driver of South Africa’s 
resurgent space program.22 These findings reveal the importance of bureaucratic actors in 
the success or failure of emerging space programs, and hint at the power that bureaucratic 
institutions hold.  
Many scholars have also considered how an EMSA’s economic capacity may guide 
its space policy. As previously discussed, developing space capacity is difficult and 
expensive, especially independent launch capabilities. Wood and Weigel note that launch 
technologies require more substantial investments than satellite development alone.23 The 
diverging technology requirements mean that EMSAs with less economic capacity can 
                                                 
18 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 13. 
19 Harding, 75. 
20 Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 187. 
21 James Clay Moltz, “Brazil’s Space Program: Dreaming with Its Feet on the Ground,” Space Policy 
33, no. 1 (August 2015): 17, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2015.05.001. 
22 Peter Martinez, “The Development and Initial Implementation of South Africa’s National Space 
Policy,” Space Policy 37, no. 1 (August 2016): 38, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2016.10.003. 
23 Wood and Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing Countries,” 21. 
7 
generally only pursue satellite technology, rather than launch technology.24 The 
technological difficulty of launch technology and its close connection with ballistic 
missiles means that EMSAs with less economic capacity may have difficulty pursuing 
security-focused space programs, with the notable exception of dual-use satellites.25 A 
country’s access to equatorial launch sites helps mitigate these launch costs, but the 
difference in technology requirements does not change.26 
Explanations based on economic capacity include an EMSA’s economic diversity 
as well. Petroni suggests that EMSAs that rely heavily on one economic sector may create 
development-focused space policy to support and grow that sector, since it will quickly 
offset the expense of space capacity.27 Put differently, the potential return on investment 
is greater for space technology that focuses on a sector that dominates an EMSA’s 
economy, rather than for a smaller sector.  
In summary, international relations, political priorities, bureaucratic institutions, 
and economic capacity can help explain why EMSAs may develop more security-focused 
or more development-focused space policies. Earlier studies tend to emphasize the 
international relations explanations, but more recent work has seen a more diverse set of 
perspectives. There is not yet a comprehensive study in the existing literature comparing 
the various theories to determine which is most important. 
2. Understanding the African Context for Space Program Development 
Regional dynamics in Africa suggest that their choices of space programs may 
deviate from other EMSAs. First, African countries are among the most aid dependent in 
the world. Aid dependency dampens Africa’s global power and undermines their 
sovereignty in domestic affairs, impacting macroeconomic decisions and domestic 
                                                 
24 Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 202. 
25 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 29–30. 
26 Petroni and Bianchi, “New Patterns of Space Policy in the Post-Cold War World,” 17. 
27 Petroni and Bianchi, 16. 
8 
governance structures in particular.28 This aid dependency often “undermines the ability 
of Africans…to determine their own best economic and political policies.”29 With a 
rapidly growing array of foreign players in African countries, however, African leaders 
have growing leverage in their international partnerships. Nonetheless, the robust presence 
of foreign donors and enduring post-colonial relationships may exert considerable 
influence on the way that African space programs emerge.  
Africa also has a distinctive security landscape characterized by non-state internal 
or transnational threats rather than inter-state conflict or competition. Specifically, a 
Congressional Research Service report on Africa lists internal conflicts, Islamist 
extremism, maritime security, and a handful of institutional weaknesses as Africa’s 
primary security concerns.30 Noticeably absent from this list are international conflicts or 
intra-African inter-state wars, though some have occurred. Instead, most African states 
behave in highly cooperative ways.31 Overall, the specific circumstances of Africa suggest 
some adaptations of the four theories outlined above to guide my research approach. 
D. HYPOTHESES 
I investigate four hypotheses to explain why EMSAs in Africa focus their space 
policies on security, development, or some mixture of the two. The four hypotheses draw 
on the explanations offered in the literature, adapted to the African EMSA context. Some 
explanations require reasonable extrapolation beyond the arguments of the original authors 
to understand how those factors might directly affect the choice of space program. The four 
                                                 
28 William Brown, “Sovereignty Matters: Africa, Donors, and the Aid Relationship,” African Affairs 
112, no. 447 (April 2013): 270–72, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adt001. 
29 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 67. 
30 Tomas F. Husted et al., Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement, CRS Report No. 
R45428 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 6–8, https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R45428. 
31 Jeffrey Ira Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
9 
hypotheses include (1) foreign security and development partnerships, (2) domestic 
political prioritization, (3) bureaucratic institutions, and (4) economic capacity.  
The first hypothesis focuses on foreign security and development partnerships, 
which relates to the international relations explanations. African EMSAs often depend on 
cooperation with international partners for access to space technology and funding. The 
convergence of space and aid dependency implies that African countries would develop 
whatever programs foreign partners are willing to sponsor. Harding’s observation that 
space policy typically mirrors terrestrial policies also suggests that existing or previous 
partnerships in other policy spheres will guide space cooperation and program 
development.32 Evidence that past partnerships or alliances constrain the evolution of 
African space policy would support this hypothesis. When EMSAs in Africa collaborate 
with existing partners, their space programs’ objectives should align with previous 
agreement priorities.  
The second hypothesis, domestic political prioritization, adopts the logic of the 
political prioritization explanation from the literature review. This hypothesis predicts that 
space programs will reflect domestic political priorities. Furthermore, the design of 
programs will help politicians to achieve both their political and policy goals. These goals 
include political survival and the use of state resources, which could include space 
resources, as a neopatrimonial tool to preserve their power.33 Consequently, politicians are 
more likely to prioritize a space program if it helps solve a primary domestic political 
concern or offers opportunities to distribute neopatrimonial benefits to political supporters. 
This hypothesis predicts that countries that politically prioritize their security concerns will 
lean towards a security-based space policy whereas those that prioritize development will 
adopt a development-focused policy, unless politicians favor a contradictory space 
program for its potential neopatrimonial benefits. Due to the non-state nature of most 
security threats in Africa, EMSAs that adopt security-focused space programs are more 
                                                 
32 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 25. 
33 Nicolas Van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16–17. 
10 
likely to develop remote sensing satellites with military or dual-use applications, since 
ballistic missiles are generally reserved for interstate conflict. 
Although the literature on bureaucratic institutions, the third hypothesis, focuses 
primarily on the success of space programs, it is not a far leap to understand how 
institutions might influence space program objectives. Since space programs require buy-
in from bureaucrats, often with their own interests, it follows that bureaucratic actors can 
push the overarching space policy towards security or development. Although an EMSA 
might have security- or development-focused space policy priorities, policy makers 
ultimately rely on bureaucratic institutions to execute their vision. A powerful defense or 
economic bureaucracy may push space policy toward its preferred applications. In other 
words, the complex array of bureaucratic interests may allow individual organizations to 
asymmetrically influence the direction of an EMSA’s space policy.  
A fourth and final hypothesis, economic capacity, argues that EMSAs in Africa 
with low levels of economic capacity are more likely to favor development-oriented space 
policy. The foundational reasons for this hypothesis are three-fold. First, the cost and risks 
of space, along with the diverging technology requirements between satellite and launch 
programs, mean that EMSAs with weak economies are unlikely to pursue satellite and 
launch capabilities simultaneously. The larger expense of launch technology, itself often 
associated with ballistic missiles, makes development-oriented satellite technologies more 
practical for low economic capacity EMSAs in Africa. Finally, EMSAs that rely on one 
economic sector generally have low economic capacity due to the lack of diversification. 
They are likely to adopt space programs to improve their primary sector, which increases 
the probability of meaningful economic returns. Conversely, EMSAs with high economic 
capacity and more diverse economies are less economically constrained in their space 
policies, so they have more freedom to choose space policies with objectives that focus on 
security, development, or some combination of the two.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses comparative case studies to examine why EMSAs in Africa favor 
security or development space policies. A comparative case study is best for answering this 
11 
question because case study methodology allows detailed examinations of many variables 
when the sample size is too small for statistically significant quantitative testing.34 
Additionally, case studies can find support for causal mechanisms when there is no obvious 
method to operationalize several variables.35 Finally, comparing cases may reveal several 
independent variables as control variables across hypotheses, resulting in better 
conclusions.36  
1. Case Selection 
This thesis examines space programs in South Africa and Nigeria. Historically, 
these two countries have been regional leaders, and they are likely to maintain their 
positions of relative power in Africa for some time.37 They also lead the region in space 
programs, and control the vast majority of satellites from Africa.38 Furthermore, South 
Africa’s and Nigeria’s roles as sub-regional powers may propel the development of other 
African EMSAs, since the most successful intra-African space cooperation occurs when 
sub-regional powers assume leadership roles, according to Froehlich and Siebrits.39 South 
Africa’s space program is particularly interesting because it permits comparisons between 
two distinct space programs over time. South Africa’s space policy was security-focused 
during the Cold War, and, after a six-year gap in space activity, transitioned to a 
development-focused policy after apartheid.40 As the leaders in space capacity in Africa 
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with the most developed space programs, South Africa and Nigeria are important cases to 
understand how space policies evolve in Africa.  
2. Identifying the Security or Development Character of Space Programs 
Whereas South Africa’s space policy transitioned from security to development 
across two distinct programs, Nigeria’s space program began with a general focus on 
development applications but has progressed to include security objectives in addition to 
the existing development applications. To further illustrate the nature of these space 
programs, I examine their stated policy goals, space institutions, and technology 
applications throughout their space history. A space agency’s policy and strategy 
documents provide a general overview of an EMSAs stated policy goals, and thus offer a 
useful starting point for understand the program’s objectives 
Beyond stated policy objectives, elements of an African EMSA’s space institutions 
help further identify their space policy’s security or development focus. The location of the 
lead space institution within the broader government organization helps to determine 
whether the program is part of the government’s development or security sectors. 
Similarly, the links between an African EMSA’s space agency and international space 
institutions may emphasize a security or development focus. Finally, the funding sources 
for specific space programs and the team that executes the program’s mission may reveal 
the program’s position on the security-development spectrum.  
Space technology is another expression of whether an EMSA has chosen a security 
or development space program. Differentiating between the technology applications helps 
to clarify space policy objectives by providing details on space policy execution. The next 
paragraphs explore development and security space technology, and describe the 
overlapping benefits for dual-use space programs. 
Development-focused space programs provide a wide variety of socioeconomic 
benefits. Many EMSAs develop space capacity with aspirations of advancing human 
capital and creating an aerospace industry with diverse job opportunities.41 More relevant 
                                                 
41 Oyewole, “Space Research and Development in Africa,” 197, 199. 
13 
than education and industry aspirations, African EMSAs harness space technology and 
infrastructure to influence other areas of development. For example, Earth observation 
(EO) satellites improve weather forecasts, monitor crops, identify potential resource 
deposits, and track human and animal populations.42 Communications satellites generate 
socioeconomic development by extending Internet access, which creates opportunities for 
“telecommunication, e-commerce, e-governance, teleeducation, and telemedicine” in 
previously difficult to reach locations.43 Finally, some African EMSAs lease their satellites 
to capitalize on their space technology investments.44 This list certainly does not include 
all development-focused space technology applications, but it illustrates how space 
technology helps fulfill development goals. 
In a military capacity, remote sensing satellites support intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance; position, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites guide precision 
weapons; communications satellites facilitate over-the-horizon communication with high 
data rates; and ballistic missiles directly employ space launch technology.45 Once again, 
this list is not all-inclusive for military space applications, and is much less inclusive for 
non-defense security utility, but it provides a general overview. So far, the space 
technology examples separate security and development objectives, but EMSAs can create 
dual-use space programs to achieve both objectives. 
In reality, many applications of space technology overlap between security and 
development. The expanding definition of security, beyond military capabilities and 
national defense, widens this overlap. Contemporary countries consider non-defense 
security policies for environmental, energy, economic, political, cultural, and health 
elements, among others.46 The data from EO satellites that monitor weather, agriculture, 
                                                 
42 Oyewole, 187, 200. 
43 Oyewole, 198. 
44 Oyewole, 198. 
45 Oyewole, 187, 201. 
46 Anton Grizold, “The Concept of National Security in the Contemporary World,” International 
Journal on World Peace 11, no. 3 (September 1994): 40–41, 46. 
14 
populations, and resources can contribute to environmental, food, political, and energy 
security since EMSAs use this data to make national security decisions.47 Similarly, the 
PNT satellites that guide advanced weapons can help a farmer implement precision 
agriculture to maximize coverage and crop yield.48 In practice, many EMSAs deploy dual-
use satellites for both security and developmental purposes, since the satellites can deliver 
data to multiple customers.49 Launch programs are distinct as potential dual-use 
technology because the direct application of launch technology to offensive military 
capabilities makes it a likely candidate for security-focused space objectives.50 
3. Investigating the Hypotheses 
To research the four hypotheses, this thesis uses a wide variety of sources including 
government documents, international agreements, economic data, and news media. 
Government documents such as policy papers, strategies, briefings, program justifications, 
and budget requests provide evidence for the domestic political priorities and bureaucratic 
institutions hypotheses by illuminating the government’s internal motivations for 
developing a space program. International agreements like memorandums of 
understanding or institutional policy documents can explain the leading actor relationships 
and internal dynamics of partnerships, which helps test the partnerships hypothesis. For the 
economic capacity hypothesis, economic data can compare and categorize the capacity of 
African EMSAs. Finally, news sources reveal additional details which may supplement or 
support more official sources for all four hypotheses.  
F. ROADMAP 
This thesis continues with three remaining chapters. The next two chapters are case 
studies on the space programs of South Africa and Nigeria, respectively. Both chapters 
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begin with a brief historical analysis of the trajectory of each country’s space program, 
highlighting stated policy goals, space institutions, and space technologies. South Africa 
had two distinct space programs: a Cold War-era program entirely focused on security 
during apartheid, and a contemporary development-focused program established by the 
post-apartheid government. Nigeria’s space program, in contrast, shifted from an initial 
focus on development to subsequently include more security applications to address 
regional terrorism concerns. I then systematically investigate the relevance of all four 
hypotheses to understand how each factor has impacted the country’s space policy 
decisions. Overall, the evidence strongly supports the political prioritization hypothesis in 
both case studies, with minimal support for the remaining three hypotheses. The 
information in the case studies set up the concluding chapter, which compares the case 
studies’ findings, explores implications, recommends policy actions, and discusses future 
research areas.  
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II. SOUTH AFRICA’S CONTEMPORARY SPACE PROGRAM 
A. OVERVIEW 
There have been two distinct space programs in South Africa’s space history. South 
Africa’s space activities transitioned from a security-focused space program that was active 
during apartheid to a contemporary program that focuses on socioeconomic development. 
This shift is surprising, since institutional inertia from South Africa’s apartheid-era space 
program could have facilitated the rebirth of a security-focused space program. This 
chapter describes the shift from the apartheid-era space program to the contemporary 
program, and analyzes the factors that influenced South Africa’s new development focus 
in its space activities.  
South Africa’s space history can be broken into three periods. First, from 1953 to 
1993, South Africa had a military-led space program, which coincided with the apartheid 
system of governance. Second, when the apartheid government lost power in the early 
1990s, the new South African government dismantled its military space program and 
transitioned to the contemporary space program, a process which lasted from 1993–2007. 
Finally, from 2008 on, South Africa has formalized its contemporary space program and 
developed new space technology to implement the country’s space policies. The first part 
of the chapter describes how South Africa’s space policies, institutions, and technology 
have shifted from a security-focus to developmental one. 
After describing South Africa’s space history, I analyze the four hypotheses laid 
out in Chapter I to understand what factors have driven this transition. I show that the shift 
to a development-focused space program is primarily a reflection of South Africa’s 
domestic political priorities. Although it is possible that other factors such as bureaucratic 
institutions exerted marginal influence on the direction of South Africa’s contemporary 
space policy, consistent alignment between South Africa’s broader political goals and its 
space policies strongly supports the political priorities hypothesis.  
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B. UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORY 
OF SOUTH AFRICA’S SPACE HISTORY 
From the 1950s to the early 1990s, an institutionalized system of racial segregation, 
known as apartheid, governed South Africans.51 Apartheid collapsed in the early 1990s 
under domestic and international pressure, and South Africa fully transitioned to a 
democracy in 1994.52 This political transformation also marked an important transition for 
South Africa’s space program, as the post-apartheid government drastically changed the 
space program’s goals, institutions, and technology. The late 2000s was another important 
period in South Africa’s space history, as government officials formalized and began 
implementing the contemporary program’s space policies. This section describes South 
Africa’s space history, and shows how the space programs evolved through each transition 
point.  
1. The Military Space Program: 1953-June 1993 
South Africa’s first space activities occurred in 1953, when a group of non-
government enthusiasts established the South African Interplanetary Society.53 This 
society, which formed the South African Rocket Research Group in 1959, began 
experimenting with rocketry, conducting over 600 engine tests and rocket launches by 
1963, none of which officially crossed into space.54 Additionally, in 1961, the South 
African government partnered with the United States to build a satellite tracking ground 
station near Johannesburg, which assisted several exploration missions run by the U.S. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) during the space race.55  
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Government officials indefinitely banned all civilian rocket launches, including the 
South African Rocket Research Group’s launches, in 1962, after which South Africa’s 
military took control of the country’s rocket program from 1963 until the early 1990s, 
including a variety of military missile programs.56 The rocket program’s space 
contribution included three sub-orbital test launches of the RSA-3, which was a South 
African rocket with Israeli origins that was theoretically capable of placing satellites into 
orbit.57 Beginning in 1975, South Africa gained access to this orbital launch technology 
through a secret military partnership with Israel to share rocket and nuclear technology.58 
The RSA-3’s sub-orbital test launches all occurred at the Overberg test range, which South 
Africa constructed throughout the 1980s to support orbital launch technology.59 The 
orbital rocket program’s underlying purpose was developing more powerful ballistic 
missiles to improve South Africa’s nuclear deterrence.60 In 1980, the government also 
began a project for a reconnaissance satellite that could spy on the Angolan military, but 
the satellite never launched.61 
By the early 1990s, international tolerance for South Africa’s military-led rocket 
program had ended. In 1991, the U.S. sanctioned arms trade with South Africa to pressure 
the South African government to conform with the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR), in response to the Israeli-South African rocketry partnership.62 The MTCR is an 
international regime devised to prevent “the spread of missiles and missile technology” in 
order to “limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by controlling 
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transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems for such weapons.”63 In the 
following two years, the South African government repeatedly expressed interest in at least 
adhering to the MTCR.64 Then, on June 30, 1993, the South Africa government ended its 
launch program, while suggesting that the U.S. should lift the 1991 sanctions in response.65 
South Africa’s decision to end its launch program also effectively ended the military-led 
space program. 
Overall, the apartheid-era space program demonstrated a strong orientation towards 
security-focused objectives. Although there was no explicit space policy for the apartheid-
era space program, its link with South Africa’s military suggests an institutional bias 
towards the security extreme of the security-development spectrum. More importantly, 
however, the space technology from the apartheid-era space program clearly indicates 
goals geared toward increasing military power and deterring Soviet expansion in the 
region.66 For example, the South African military used the South African Rocket Research 
Group’s experiments to improve short-range missile technology. Additionally, government 
officials planned to launch a military reconnaissance satellite to spy on the military 
activities of South Africa’s adversaries. Most significantly, South Africa established a 
partnership with Israel to access orbital launch technology in an effort to advance South 
Africa’s ballistic missile capacity.  
2. The Transition: July 1993–2007 
Starting in July 1993, just as political leaders set an election date and evaluated a 
new constitution, the South African government began transitioning toward a new 
contemporary space program with vastly different objectives.67 Just two days after ending 
the apartheid-era launch program, the South African government passed the Space Affairs 
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Act of 1993, South Africa’s first contemporary space legislation.68 The Space Affairs Act 
of 1993 endorsed the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) as the contemporary space 
program’s lead institution by empowering the Minister of Trade and Industry (MTI) to 
define South African space policy, and mandating other government ministers to exercise 
their responsibilities in accordance with the MTI’s space policy.69 Also, the Space Affairs 
Act established a Council for Space Affairs to advise and regulate space activity in South 
Africa.70 Finally, the Space Affairs Act also instructed the MTI to regulate and limit space 
technology that could support weapons of mass destruction, like ballistic missiles.71 The 
DTI’s leading role in the contemporary space program demonstrates South Africa’s focus 
on using space technology to advance socioeconomic development. If national security 
was the primary objective, it is more likely that the South African Parliament would have 
directed the Department of Defence, or another security-focused institution, to administer 
national space policy, similar to the military’s control of South Africa’s space program 
during apartheid.72 Instead, the DTI’s broader focus on economic trade and growth created 
an institutional bias toward socioeconomic development, despite a broad policy vacuum. 
For the next decade, as the post-apartheid South African government established 
new policies and laws based on the ideals of democratic governance, South Africa’s space 
leaders primarily focused on ending the apartheid-era program. Martinez describes space 
activity in the 1990s as taking place “in an isolated, uncoordinated ad hoc fashion at the 
institutional level and in a policy vacuum at national level.”73 Government officials 
dismantled the infrastructure that supported South Africa’s first space program, especially 
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launch capacity.74 A notable exception was the Overberg test range, which the new space 
program inherited with the elements required for orbital launch intact.75 Although the test 
range has only supported non-space systems testing since then, it remains capable of 
launching sun-synchronous and polar orbits up to low Earth orbit (LEO).76 In 1995, during 
this near-complete breakaway from the security-focused launch program, South Africa 
officially joined the MTCR, which signaled the government’s enduring assurance that 
South Africa would not resume its proliferation of missile technology.77 
The launch of South Africa’s first satellite in 1999 indicated that the contemporary 
space program was advancing. SunSat-1, the first South African satellite in orbit, was an 
experimental satellite that launched on a Delta II rocket from Vandenburg Air Force Base, 
California, in 1999.78 Postgraduate students at the University of Stellenbosch designed and 
constructed the majority of SunSat-1, including a variety of experiments and a high-
resolution imager as the payload.79 The high-resolution imager achieved a ground 
resolution of 15 meters, which was advanced for a microsatellite at the time.80 Arguably, 
the high-resolution imager could have supported a security mission by capturing images of 
large objects like large ships, sizeable aircraft, or military bases, but the actual images 
transmitted to a ground station at the University of Stellenbosch, including images of 
mountains in South Africa and irrigation systems in the Middle East, make the security 
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alternative unlikely.81 Additionally, the students allowed NASA officials to include an 
experiment onboard in exchange for NASA sponsoring the Delta II launch.82  
Starting in the early 2000s, government interest in the socioeconomic benefits of 
space activity became more apparent.83 In 2003, the Department of Science and 
Technology (DST) and several space advocates, including Martinez, began to coordinate 
and unify the diverse interests in space activity across departments within South Africa’s 
national government.84 Then, in 2007, government officials passed the Astronomy 
Geographic Advantage Act of 2007.85 This act allowed the Minister of Science and 
Technology (MST) to declare an area within South Africa as an astronomy advantage area, 
thereby subjecting that area to a collection of regulations designed to protect and preserve 
the natural conditions that benefit astronomy activities.86 In other words, the Astronomy 
Geographic Advantage Act focused exclusively on protecting observatory science, which 
overwhelmingly benefits development objectives rather than security objectives.87 The 
Astronomy Geographic Advantage Act was the final example of space activity in South 
Africa’s transition toward its contemporary space program.  
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Although there was no explicit space policy during this period of transition, South 
Africa’s space institutions and technology illustrate the contemporary space program’s 
divergence from the military focus of the apartheid-era space program. The South African 
government placed its new space institutions under departments, like the DTI and DST, 
that already directed their efforts toward socioeconomic development. More importantly, 
the post-apartheid government actively dismantled the country’s launch capacity, which 
was the cornerstone of the apartheid-era program.  
3. Space for South Africa’s Development: 2008-Present 
The Space Affairs Act of 1993 had already established regulatory institutions, but 
the South African government lacked an institution responsible for implementing space 
policy and delivering space-related activities and products to the diverse array of 
government space customers. The South African National Space Agency Act of 2008 
established the South African National Space Agency (SANSA) under the DST to 
accomplish these exact objectives and fill the institutional gap.88 By placing SANSA under 
the DST, which uses science and technology to advance South Africa’s socioeconomic 
development, the government officials continued the contemporary space program’s 
institutional bias.89 The South African National Space Agency Act listed five objectives 
of the new space agency that institutionalized South Africa’s focus on peaceful space 
activities: to improve space industry, science, technology, human capital, and international 
cooperation.90 
Shortly after the establishment of SANSA, the National Space Policy, published in 
2009, filled the policy vacuum. The DTI’s National Space Policy explicitly states, “the 
guiding principle of the Policy is to support and promote relevant scientific research, 
capacity-building, innovation, and industrial development, with the aim of utilising space 
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applications to contribute to economic growth, reduction of poverty, and the creation of 
knowledge.”91 Notably, the National Space Policy also repeatedly emphasizes the 
importance of improving space capacity for the explicit benefit of socioeconomic 
development. Space capacity, in this instance, refers to the human capital, material 
resources, and institutions required to produce space technology, which especially benefits 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) sectors. For example, the 
National Space Policy states that space capabilities are a “strong driving force for new 
technological developments, with many subsequent applications of benefit to the 
sustainable development of our economy, society and the environment.”92 The space 
capabilities to which this statement refers also include the associated human capital 
requirements.93 Thus, South Africa’s space policy sees its space capacity as a way to 
advance the country’s broader socioeconomic interests, going as far as to call space 
capacity development “one of the cornerstones upon which the National Space Programme 
is built.”94 In short, space capacity was seen as a path to broader economic diversification 
and growth beyond the space sector, especially in STEM-related fields. 
Additionally, in 2009, a second South African satellite, SumbandilaSat, reached 
orbit, demonstrating capacity growth in technology and domestic industry. 
SumbandilaSat’s mission was technology demonstration, proving the satellite technology 
capacity of the University of Stellenbosch and a nascent university spin-off company called 
SunSpace.95 This time, Russia launched South Africa’s satellite on a Soyuz-2 out of 
Kazakhstan in 2009.96 SumbandilaSat’s primary payload was a multispectral imager (MSI) 
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with a 6.25m resolution.97 The MSI’s six spectral bands optimized images for agricultural 
and disaster management purposes.98 
Published in 2010, the DST’s National Space Strategy continued formalizing the 
contemporary space program by supplementing South Africa’s stated space objectives. The 
National Space Strategy guides SANSA by providing an implementation framework to 
fulfill the DTI’s National Space Policy. The vision of the National Space Strategy states 
that South Africa should become a leader in “space science and technology to enhance 
economic growth and sustainable development and thus improve the quality of life for 
all.”99 The alignment of this vision statement with the National Space Policy’s guiding 
principle is unsurprising, given that the National Space Strategy helps to implement the 
National Space Policy. In identifying areas for future advancement, the DST highlights 
three key benefits that it hopes the space program will deliver— (1) environmental resource 
management; (2) health, safety, and security; and (3) innovation and economic growth.100 
The second key benefit in the National Space Strategy—health, safety, and security—
seems to favor security goals, but six of the seven sub-priorities under this category target 
forecasting disasters, mitigating risk, and monitoring legal compliance.101 Put simply, the 
benefits and sub-priorities that the National Space Strategy establishes strongly favor 
socioeconomic development. 
Interestingly, South Africa used this period of space policy formalization to also 
influence space policy across the African continent. In 2010, the Fourth African Ministerial 
Conference on Science and Technology recommended creating a Space Working Group 
(SWG) to establish the African Space Policy for the African Union (AU).102 South Africa 
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was one of ten member states on the SWG, which consisted of states with “recognised 
expertise in space affairs, a national interest in shaping space policy, and in coordinating 
inputs from a variety of user sectors and [AU] policy organs.”103 In short, the members of 
the SWG were the regional space leaders within Africa with directions to create the AU’s 
space policy. The SWG drafted the African Space Policy as a guide for an AU space 
program, which would use space technology to benefit the African continent.104 The 
African Space Policy outlines just two goals; to serve the “social, economic, political and 
environmental needs of the continent,” and to create space regulations that ensure Africa 
is “a responsible and peaceful user of outer space.”105  
Throughout the 2010s, South Africa’s space institutions and stated objectives 
remained constant, and SANSA used this decade to advance South Africa’s space 
technology. In 2011, for example, South Africa firmly established itself as one of the global 
leaders in observatory science when the South African Large Telescope (SALT) began 
operations. SALT, which has contributed to 265 scientific papers since 2011, is one of the 
largest single optical telescopes in the world, and the largest telescope of this type in the 
southern hemisphere.106 The SALT Foundation, which owns and operates the telescope, 
is a South African private company with international shareholders from the United States, 
South Africa, Poland, the United Kingdom, and India.107 SALT’s three objectives are to 
“enable world-leading astrophysical research, pursue instrumentation development, and 
drive human capital development and science engagement.”108 Notably, SALT’s 
instruments were the first to capture a star’s supernova, providing invaluable data to the 
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astrophysics community.109 The unique capabilities of SALT make the telescope one of 
South Africa’s flagship space programs. 
For its third satellite, which launched in 2013, South Africa deliberately advanced 
its space capacity by venturing into the nanosatellite niche with a CubeSat called ZACUBE-
1.110 Weighing in at just 1.2 kilograms, ZACUBE-1 was another research satellite, which 
the Cape Peninsula University of Technology developed with the goal of improving South 
Africa’s space engineering human capital.111 Like SumbandilaSat, Russia launched 
ZACUBE-1, this time from a launch facility in Yasny on a Dnepr rocket in 2013.112 The 
satellite’s primary payload, a high-frequency beacon transmitter, has two purposes: to 
calibrate a radar array at SANSA’s Antarctic research base and to study space weather by 
examining the Earth’s ionosphere.113 
In 2014, in what appears to be the only departure from the stated developmental 
goals of South African space policy, Russia launched South Africa’s fourth satellite, a top-
secret Department of Defence satellite called Kondor-E.114 South Africa’s Department of 
Defence contracted a Russian company named NPO Mashinostroyeniya to build the 
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military satellite in 2006.115 At the start of the Kondor-E contract, SANSA did not yet 
exist, and it is unclear if the Department of Defence included the DTI, DST, or Russian 
space agency in the contract process. The primary payload on Kondor-E is a synthetic 
aperture radar (SAR) capable of taking radar images with a ground resolution of 1–2 
meters, despite cloud cover.116 Kondor-E’s SAR system is particularly useful for security 
missions, which require monitoring small objects, like ships or vehicles, on a frequent 
basis, regardless of the weather.117 Unfortunately, reliable information on Kondor-E is 
somewhat limited, especially considering allegations that South Africa’s State Security 
Agency relied on a human intelligence source to discover details about the top-secret 
project, which suggests that the State Security Agency did not know about the South 
African satellite project beforehand.118 These collective reports about Kondor-E appear to 
contain at least some validity, however, based on a statement by the South African 
Secretary of Defence that mistakenly revealed the existence of a military satellite to the 
broader South African government.119 
The fifth and sixth South African satellites, launched simultaneously in 2017, 
marked a return to the program’s developmental orientation. The satellites were part of an 
international CubeSat constellation dedicated to scientific research called QB50, which the 
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European Union partially sponsored.120 Both ZA-AeroSat and nSight-1 launched onboard 
a United Launch Alliance Atlas-5 out of Florida in 2017, although the International Space 
Station deployed ZA-AeroSat a few days before nSight-1.121 The broad objectives of the 
QB50 constellation were enabling relatively cheap access to space by launching 50 
university-developed CubeSats, and studying the lower thermosphere for an extended 
period of up to several months.122 Both satellites contained the same primary payload, an 
instrument called the Flux-Φ-Probe Experiment (FIPEX).123 The FIPEX payload allowed 
the satellites to study the effects of atomic oxygen on spacecraft surfaces as the spacecraft 
entered thicker portions of Earth’s atmosphere.124 Whereas the University of Stellenbosch 
primarily developed ZA-AeroSat, a group of privately owned South African satellite 
companies called SCS Aerospace Group built nSight-1.125 
ZACUBE-2, South Africa’s seventh satellite, is the most technologically advanced 
satellite in South Africa’s constellation to date. Cape Peninsula University of Technology 
developed the satellite with SANSA sponsoring the mission.126 Similar to many previous 
South African satellites, Russia launched ZACUBE-2, this time in 2018.127 The satellite is 
a technology demonstrator for future CubeSats that will fly in a maritime domain 
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awareness constellation under the ocean economy sector of Operation Phakisa.128 This 
sector of Operation Phakisa focuses on developing the economic potential of the ocean 
through six work streams, specifically active in South Africa’s exclusive economic 
zone.129 ZACUBE-2 supports this ocean economic development by providing South Africa 
with independent automatic identification system (AIS) monitoring capabilities at a 
reduced cost and without third-party risk, when compared to commercial AIS systems.130 
ZACUBE-2’s AIS capabilities may support a dual-use mission, since AIS facilitates 
collision avoidance, navigation, and vessel monitoring, but ZACUBE-2’s relationship with 
the development-oriented Operation Phakisa indicates that maritime security is not the 
primary purpose of the satellite. Furthermore, the utility of AIS in maritime security is 
limited because ships participating in illegal activities can simply turn their AIS transmitter 
off. Of the six work streams, ZACUBE-2’s AIS technology best assists the first, marine 
transport and manufacturing, and fourth, marine protection and governance, work streams 
by facilitating vessel tracking.131  
South Africa’s eighth and most recent satellite, XinaBox ThinSat, is the smallest 
satellite that students have developed in the country, and the program notably provided 
human capacity growth at the high-school level. Unlike the larger CubeSats from university 
students, South African high school students across 16 schools developed one ThinSat that 
launched as a part of a larger constellation to extreme LEO.132 The ThinSats launched 
onboard an Antares rocket out of Virginia in 2019.133 For just a few days, the small ThinSat 
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constellation took basic measurements from a variety of sensors, which included an inertial 
measurement unit, temperature gauges, and infrared sensors.134 Rather than contributing 
to a major scientific breakthrough, the short-lived South African ThinSat program was an 
effort to encourage space enthusiasm and human capital development at a young age.135 
Specifically, the goal of the ThinSat program was to inspire young students to eventually 
work in STEM careers by exposing the students to the space industry with high-tech 
projects like data analysis, sensor testing, and satellite hardware development.136  
Overall, the space policies, institutions, and technologies established in South 
Africa after 2007 solidified the focus of South Africa’s contemporary space program. For 
the first time, South Africa had explicit national level space policies, which 
overwhelmingly demonstrated the contemporary space program’s commitment to pursuing 
space activities for their potential development benefits. Furthermore, many of South 
Africa’s space technology programs explicitly aimed to improve space capacity and human 
capital in STEM fields. The Kondor-E was the only space activity focused on security since 
South Africa’s apartheid-era space program, and its scope was extremely minor in 
comparison to South Africa’s broader space program.  
4. Future Plans 
SANSA’s Strategic Plan for 2020–2025, which SANSA published in 2020 as a 
policy update, specifically addresses how the space agency intends to continue 
implementing the objectives set forth in the National Space Policy and National Space 
Strategy. Considering these stated policy goals, SANSA asserts that the fundamental 
purpose of a space program is to meet its government’s highest priority, which in this case 
is socioeconomic development.137 Similarly, both SANSA’s vision statement and mission 
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statement in the plan address the advancement of human lives through space activities.138 
SANSA’s strategic plan primarily examines future and aspirational space technologies to 
achieve South Africa’s space policy objectives. Interestingly, the 2020–2025 SANSA 
Strategic Plan mentions evaluating the feasibility and potential benefits of domestic launch 
capabilities, which aligns with a 2010 speech by Naledi Pandor, then the MST, in which 
she briefly spoke about creating a 20-year plan to re-establish launch capabilities.139 
Nascent South African space launch ambitions do not inherently constitute a new security 
focus for the country’s space policy, even though launch technology may appear to 
reactivate South Africa’s first security-focused space program. SANSA could use launch 
technology solely to reduce its dependence on foreign countries for launching satellites 
with development missions. Nevertheless, launch technology provides an easy path to 
ballistic missile technology, and potentially represents a small deviation away from South 
Africa’s broader focus on development objectives in its space policies.  
Finally, The Square Kilometre Array (SKA) is another flagship space program in 
South Africa. The SKA, with support from 20 countries, aims to become the most advanced 
and largest radio telescope in the world, with construction beginning in 2021.140 As one 
of two host countries for SKA, South Africa will build upon its precursor test facility called 
MeerKAT, creating an array of 200 satellite dishes across 150 kilometers.141 The array’s 
primary objective is to answer some of the most challenging scientific questions of the 
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modern era.142 These “science drivers” include discoveries in dark energy, gravity, 
magnetism, star formation, and interstellar life.143 
In summary, South Africa’s space history illustrates a clear shift from an entirely 
security-focused space program during apartheid to a contemporary space program that 
focuses almost exclusively on improving socioeconomic development. South Africa’s first 
space program primarily produced rocket technology for military use. As apartheid ended, 
South Africa’s space program entered a period of transition. This transition created a new 
contemporary space program, focused on socioeconomic development, that was divorced 
from the apartheid-era space program. After the DTI published the National Space Policy 
in 2009, SANSA spent over a decade implementing a space program to meet the 
development-focused objectives in the National Space Policy by supporting numerous 
satellites and astronomy programs. SANSA’s most recent strategic plan and the flagship 
SKA program reveal that the contemporary space program’s focus on socioeconomic 
development is likely to continue for at least the next five years.  
C. EXAMINING THE HYPOTHESES 
The remainder of this chapter turns to the question of why South Africa has shifted 
from a security-focused to a development-focused space program. The possible answers, 
outlined in the previous chapter, include foreign influence, political priorities, bureaucratic 
interests, and economic capacity. As the following analysis will show, all four hypotheses 
feasibly influence South Africa’s space policy, but only the political prioritization 
hypothesis has strong support.   
1. Foreign Security and Development Partnerships 
The primary question to answer for the first hypothesis is as follows: do foreign 
partnerships influence South Africa’s space policy? Influence, in this instance, refers to a 
foreign country’s capacity to direct South African space policy toward development or 
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security goals. This section seeks to answer the question of influence in two ways. First, 
and most importantly, I examine if foreign partners pushed South Africa’s space program 
to have the central development-focus that is present today. Second, this hypothesis 
searches for instances of foreign influence that created the limited security objectives 
present in South Africa’s space program. This second scenario looks for evidence that a 
foreign country successfully diverted South Africa’s space program away from its stated 
development goals, to instead focus on the narrow security mission regarding Kondor-E. 
In general, a foreign country may be more likely to successfully influence South African 
space policy when South Africa is dependent on that foreign country for space technology 
or launch capacity. Thus, this hypothesis focuses on South Africa’s international space 
partnerships. Furthermore, foreign influence can occur throughout South Africa’s space 
history, but it is most likely to appear during the program’s initial establishment since South 
Africa would be most dependent on foreign partners during this time.  
Notably, the development of South Africa’s first satellite, SunSat-1, and the 1996 
agreement between South Africa and NASA, regarding the launch of SunSat-1, contradicts 
the foreign influence hypothesis.144 In 1991, the University of Stellenbosch began 
formulating the engineering, science, and research objectives of SunSat-1, including the 
objective to produce imagery resolution better than 20 meters in a micro-satellite.145 
Sometime around 1994, SunSat-1 lost its paid position on an Ariane Helios launch due to 
reduced funding, which resulted in a launch memorandum of understanding with NASA in 
1996 for SunSat-1.146 This timeline demonstrates that the University of Stellenbosch 
initiated SunSat-1’s development focus well before there was any potential for U.S. 
influence. Additionally, South Africa’s initial willingness to pay for SunSat-1’s launch 
indicates limited opportunities for influence before the launch agreement. NASA’s science 
instruments, integrated onto SunSat-1 as a part of the launch agreement, simply added to 
the satellite’s development mission. Most importantly, University of Stellenbosch graduate 
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students developed the satellite’s primary imager, electronic systems, and software almost 
entirely in-house, suggesting a high degree of agency in deciding SunSat-1’s development 
objectives since the satellite did not rely on technology transfer.147 
More significantly, SunSat-1 demonstrates that government officials and the 
University of Stellenbosch maintained control over the satellite’s development objectives, 
despite the various opportunities for U.S. influence. The first opportunity for influence 
emerged because the University of Stellenbosch developed SunSat-1 when South Africa 
had only a handful of space institutions, established by the Space Affairs Act of 1993, that 
were operating without any explicit space policy guidance. Next, the United States was 
indisputably the most advanced space country in the world in the late 1990s, which 
contrasted against South Africa’s nascent contemporary space program at the time. Finally, 
SunSat-1 had to attach NASA’s advanced global positioning system receiver and 
Meteoroid Impact Sensor, which would conduct science experiments, as a condition of the 
launch memorandum of understanding with NASA.148 Thus, SunSat-1 had strong potential 
for U.S. influence on South Africa’s space program: dependency for access to space, 
limited institutional inertia, divergence in space capabilities, and a push for development-
focused objectives due to NASA’s scientific experiments. Regardless of these four factors 
indicating potential U.S. influence, the evidence clearly points to South African agency in 
deciding the trajectory of SunSat-1’s objectives. 
The SunSat-1 case is representative of most of South Africa’s space programs 
where, despite reliance on foreign partnerships to access space, there is no evidence of 
foreign influence on the direction of the space program. By nature of being an EMSA 
without launch capabilities, South Africa depends on foreign countries for access to space. 
Unlike most EMSAs, however, South Africa has the capability to domestically produce 
most of its satellite technology, which allows it to pursue its own path with respect to 
satellite development. South Africa’s space sector has proven its ability to produce 
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satellites by domestically developing seven of the country’s eight satellites.149 The lone 
exception to these domestically-produced satellites is the Kondor-E military satellite, 
which I explore in detail later in this section. Domestic production indicates limited foreign 
involvement in South Africa’s satellite technology, which means foreign countries or 
institutions assist South Africa’s space technology rather than transfer technology to South 
Africa. In this sense, South Africa does not need to trade its agency in deciding the 
objectives of any particular space project for access to specific technology.  
SANSA’s expansive list of international space partners provides further indication 
that its space policy is not a product of foreign influence since having various partner 
options makes influence from any single partner less likely. Even from SANSA’s first 
annual report in 2012, South Africa worked with 13 different foreign space agencies.150 
For comparison, the 2017–2018 annual report tallies 14 memorandums of understanding 
with overseas partners.151 The most recent SANSA annual report from 2019, shows that 
SANSA actively collaborated with 15 overseas partners during this time period.152 
SANSA deliberately emphasizes the strategic importance of cultivating various 
international partnerships to create additional space opportunities and reduce dependency 
on any one country.153 Maintaining several space partners, at differing stages of space 
capacity development, allows SANSA to examine multiple partnership options when 
considering how to complete a new space project. In effect, South Africa has an 
international marketplace to pitch each space project and its objectives. If one potential 
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partner tries to drastically deviate from SANSA’s desired space objectives on a project, 
then SANSA could reasonably find a new international partner with a more complementary 
goal. Put simply, this competitive marketplace protects South Africa’s space policy from 
any single country’s strong influence. 
In contrast, the acquisition of the Kondor-E satellite is one outlying example, in 
which Russian foreign influence is plausible. Unfortunately, the classified nature of 
Kondor-E makes definitive evidence of Russian influence almost impossible to find; 
however, there are some takeaways and inferences from the limited reporting. South 
African news reported that South Africa’s Defence Intelligence paid the Russian company 
NPO Mashinostroyeniya 1.2 billion rand to build the satellite, which is one explanation for 
the rise in Defence Intelligence spending between 2007 and 2011.154 Despite this high 
price, additional reporting suggested that South African Defence Intelligence would not 
control Kondor-E, nor be able to quickly or cheaply access its images, due to a “flaw” in 
the original contract, which caused government officials to temporarily suspend payments 
for Kondor-E in 2008.155 In other words, Kondor-E’s original contract had South African 
Defence Intelligence paying for a satellite that they could not control, which would indicate 
that Kondor-E may have been a South African satellite only in name. Kondor-E’s high 
price and South Africa’s debatable access to the satellite seem to indicate that Russia held 
at least some foreign influence over this particular aspect of South Africa’s space program. 
Otherwise, without Russian influence, South Africa’s space development objectives would 
offer little incentive for an expensive security satellite purchase that South Africa would 
not even control. It seems that Russian influence could possibly explain South Africa’s 
Kondor-E contract, but there is no direct evidence to support this argument.  
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The connection between the launch of SumbandilaSat and the Kondor-E contract 
provides an additional example of possible Russian influence. South Africa’s space access 
dependency was most apparent with the Russian launch of South Africa’s SumbandilaSat. 
According to the head of Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, Russia refused to launch 
SumbandilaSat in 2008, after the South African Department of Defence rejected a Russian 
satellite.156 It seems that the head of Roscosmos, Perminov, was referring to the frozen 
Kondor-E contract, which the South African Department of Defence stopped making 
payments on due to concerns over Defence Intelligence’s debatable control over the 
Kondor-E.157 In this instance, Russia held SumbandilaSat’s launch hostage until South 
Africa resumed payments for the Kondor-E security satellite. South Africa presumably 
restarted payments, since Russia ultimately launched both SumbandilaSat and Kondor-E. 
It is not clear whether or not the launch of SumbandilaSat was always an explicit clause in 
the Kondor-E contract.158 In either case, Russia temporarily prevented South Africa from 
realizing its development-focused space program, while also pushing a security-focused 
satellite contract. Russia’s actions reveal that South Africa’s foreign launch dependence 
makes its space program vulnerable to foreign influence, even if evidence to understand 
the extent of Russia’s influence is inconclusive.  
In summary, the foreign security and development partnerships hypothesis is 
unlikely to apply to the broader development-focused South African space program, but 
possibly explains the outlier, security-focused Kondor-E program. South Africa has 
demonstrated space technology capacity that is atypical for an EMSA, which helps protect 
the space program against foreign influence associated with technology transfer 
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agreements. Additionally, SANSA’s numerous international partners give the space 
program alternatives if one partner tries to exert unwanted influence. Conversely, the 
Kondor-E case demonstrates that SANSA’s reliance on international partners for space 
access leaves South Africa open to foreign influence. Still, there is no evidence to support 
the idea that foreign partnerships significantly impact the country’s development-focused 
space policy.  
2. Domestic Political Prioritization 
South Africa’s transition out of apartheid in the early 1990s changed the 
government’s political priorities to focus more on socioeconomic development for citizens 
of all races, and likely contributed to the early development-focused decisions in South 
Africa’s space policy. As the apartheid National Party government began to face civil 
resistance in the 1970s and 1980s, officials attempted to maintain political power and 
control over the population through military force.159 President de Klerk began 
transitioning South Africa’s political priorities from security-focused to development-
focused when, in 1990, he removed the ban on the African National Congress (ANC), 
among other political parties, in an attempt to reduce domestic resistance, reverse South 
Africa’s international isolation, and, consequently, improve South Africa’s economic 
outlook.160 It is unlikely that de Klerk envisioned the ANC as a legitimate political threat, 
but the ANC won the majority in the 1994 election by campaigning on socioeconomic 
development, especially for Black and mixed race populations that had been denied 
economic opportunities and political equality under apartheid.161 Once in power, the ANC 
enacted a series of policies—the Reconstruction and Development Programme in 1994; the 
Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Policy in 1997; the Employment Equity Act of 
1998; and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003—all aimed at 
                                                 
159 Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa, 131. 
160 Worden, 147. 
161 Worden, 148, 154. 
41 
reducing South Africa’s pervasive socioeconomic inequality.162 Thus, South Africa’s 
development-focused political environment throughout the 1990s and early 2000s fully 
aligned with the government’s early space policy decisions, like the development-focused 
Space Affairs Act of 1993 and SunSat-1 program. Unfortunately, racial segregation under 
apartheid created long-term socioeconomic challenges that the ANC policies failed to 
address, including “high levels of poverty, social inequality, and unemployment, as well as 
unequal access to education, municipal services, and other resources.”163  
From 2008 to 2010, around the publishing of the National Space Policy and 
National Space Strategy, South Africa’s government transitioned between presidential 
administrations, yet maintained continuity with respect to broadly favoring development 
objectives instead of security. In 2008, President Mbeki resigned the presidency after nine 
years because the ANC recalled him.164 President Motlanthe served a short term after 
Mbeki, until 2009 when South Africa elected President Zuma, both of whom were also 
members of the ANC.165 Despite the quick transitions that occurred in a three-year period, 
all three presidents promoted a vision centered on socioeconomic development. This 
development-focused vision aligned with the ANC’s relentless efforts since the end of 
apartheid to overcome many development challenges associated with racial segregation.166 
All three presidents used similar language in their state of the nation addresses. President 
Mbeki primarily spoke about 24 “Apex Priorities” to improve South Africa’s quality of 
life, particularly focusing on economic development, poverty reduction, and education.167 
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Although President Motlanthe’s speech primarily emphasized the strength of democratic 
institutions and the consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008, he also highlighted 
the importance of continued focus on development, specifically citing recommendations 
from South Africa’s Growth and Development Summit.168 Finally, President Zuma 
continued the development trend when he reaffirmed the government’s commitment to five 
priorities, “education, health, rural development and land reform, creating decent work, 
and fighting crime.”169 These collective statements, across different administrations, 
demonstrated South Africa’s persistent drive for socioeconomic development, a drive that 
followed the ANC’s priorities. In the most crucial years for space policy, South Africa’s 
presidents guided the government toward development goals.  
Unsurprisingly, the national budgets from 2008 to 2010 also reflected South 
Africa’s broad development objectives. Budget projections for the 2008 fiscal year 
assigned almost 80% of the total allocated expenditure to social and economic services, 
contrasting only 15% to protection services.170 Similarly, the 2009 budget review placed 
two-thirds of allocated expenditures in the development-focused categories of housing and 
community amenities, economic affairs, education, and social protection, while the 
categories of defense, public order, and safety remained around 15%.171 Finally, the 2010 
budget review’s allocated expenditure percentages almost exactly matched the 2009 budget 
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review, within one or two percentage points.172 Unfortunately, changes in the naming 
convention for functional categories between 2008 and 2009 make a direct comparison 
between budgets problematic.173 Instead, the key takeaway from comparing multiple 
budgets is the continued dominance of development spending over security spending. 
South Africa also consistently spends significantly less on security, as a percentage of total 
government spending, than both the global average and the average within sub-Saharan 
Africa. For example, in 2008, the South African government spent about 4% of its total 
spending on its military, compared to about 6% in sub-Saharan Africa and 6.6% in the 
world.174 The enduring trend of favoring development spending, and presidential speeches 
highlighting the importance of socioeconomic development, effectively demonstrate that 
South Africa politically prioritizes development objectives. Further, the evidence of space 
policy aligning with domestic political priorities throughout South Africa’s post-apartheid 
era supports this hypothesis. 
South Africa’s most recent budget review continues with the development theme 
from the most critical years of establishing space policy. The 2020 budget review projects 
South African government expenditures from 2020 to 2023. Over two-thirds of the total 
allocated expenditures during this time period will go to socioeconomic development 
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programs, compared to just one-eighth spent on security.175 Even in the supplemental 
budget that factors in the implications of COVID-19, development expenditures increased 
its share of total spending by 0.5%, while security lost 0.2%.176 Clearly, the South African 
government plans to continue its preference of spending money on development issues 
instead of security challenges.  
A second dimension of the political priorities hypothesis relates to the potential 
political benefits that leaders may obtain from space policy. Clientelism is a common 
characteristic in the politics of many African countries, including South Africa, thereby 
necessitating further examination in this hypothesis. The domestic political priorities 
hypothesis predicts that politicians may use space programs to advance private political 
goals, like raising political funds or rewarding supporters. For example, a politician 
employing the tools of patronage may grant a government contract to a particular domestic 
company if the contractor has offered political support in the past, or might do so in the 
future.  
The Kondor-E satellite is the only South African space program with even indirect 
evidence of clientelism. South Africa’s Department of Defence signed the Kondor-E 
contract during a period of defense contracting scandals involving President Mbeki and the 
ANC. For example, a 1999 arms deal erupted in scandal after allegations that Mbeki 
received bribes from the winning contractors, and that the ANC also received campaign 
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funding from the deal.177 Based on these previous defense contracting scandals, the 
Kondor-E contract may have provided personal bribes and political funding to Mbeki and 
the ANC, especially considering the satellite’s top-secret classification. The bribes and 
funding would have helped the ANC, and President Mbeki, maintain political power, which 
may have incentivized the transaction. Additionally, the contract may have allowed 
President Mbeki to distribute state resources to loyal supporters. For example, the leaked 
top-secret document that Al Jazeera obtained specifically names former General Motau of 
the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF) Defence Intelligence as a key figure 
in the Kondor-E program.178 The document also claims that Motau was working with a 
state-owned defense and security company named Denel for the satellite.179 A top secret 
space contract worth approximately 1.2 billion rand would give Motau control of 
significant state resources with little accountability, thereby allowing him to funnel money 
into his personal accounts. Motau was serving as the Chief of Defence Intelligence for 
SANDF when he allegedly placed the order for Kondor-E in 2006.180 Thus, it is feasible 
that Motau could have controlled this specific contract, allowing him to realize sizeable 
personal benefits from Kondor-E. Although there is no direct evidence supporting this 
argument, the indirect evidence certainly makes it possible. Conceivably, clientelism in 
defense contracting is key to understanding the limited security-focused objectives present 
in South Africa’s space program.  
Overall, South Africa’s space policy has consistently aligned with the country’s 
broader domestic political priorities, which lends strong support to this hypothesis. The 
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space policy’s alignment with the government’s priorities is constant throughout the post-
apartheid era, including in the critical stages of space policy and strategy 
institutionalization in the 1990s and 2000s. South Africa’s space program is simply one 
component of the government’s larger socioeconomic development machine, and may at 
times serve some clientelistic functions as well. Considering South Africa’s general focus 
on socioeconomic development since the end of apartheid, the domestic political 
prioritization hypothesis has strong support. 
3. Bureaucratic Institutions 
Bureaucratic institutions are key to implementing any government policy, including 
space policy. Some institutions, however, can have a more powerful effect on policy than 
others. This hypothesis explores how South African institutions, and the relationships 
between institutions, affect space policy, especially considering the possible influence of 
bureaucratic institutions from South Africa’s apartheid-era space program. Specifically, 
this section examines if bureaucratic interests pushed South Africa’s space policy toward 
development in the transition period, when government officials established South Africa’s 
contemporary space program.  
The dismantling of South Africa’s first space program in the early 1990s likely 
ended any bureaucratic inertia to continue with security-focused space policies in South 
Africa’s contemporary space program. With the exception of select space infrastructure 
from the apartheid-era program, like the Overberg range, the contemporary space program 
was a fresh start from South Africa’s first space program.181 The clean break between the 
two space programs likely neutralized the influence of bureaucratic institutions from the 
apartheid-era space program. This is especially probable, considering that launch 
programs—the primary focus of South Africa’s first space program—have vastly different 
development requirements from satellite programs, which are the focus of South Africa’s 
contemporary space program. Thus, it is unlikely that, in the early 1990s, bureaucratic 
inertia pushed the contemporary space program toward security objectives.  
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SANDF’s early lack of interest in South Africa’s contemporary space program 
almost certainly further removed bureaucratic pressure toward security objectives. Instead 
of dismantling South Africa’s security forces in the early 1990s, like the space program, 
the transitioning government instituted a series of reforms. Leading up to the 1994 election, 
the South African government created the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee, and 
directed the committee to establish the post-apartheid Department of Defence and SANDF, 
while incorporating the interests of various security forces in South Africa, including the 
apartheid government’s South African Defence Force and the ANC’s military branch.182 
The committee decided to merge South Africa’s five existing constituent forces, several of 
which had previously clashed during apartheid, which created significant tension in 
SANDF.183 In short, when South Africa passed the Space Affairs Act of 1993, its security 
forces were focusing on internal tensions and reform. Thus, it is unlikely that there was any 
bureaucratic security interest in initially guiding South Africa’s contemporary space 
policy. Even into the early 2000s, Martinez remarks that “the South African National 
Defence Force no longer had an active interest in developing independent space 
capabilities, so the policy area of outer space affairs was open for other actors to 
pursue.”184 SANDF’s disinterest almost certainly allowed the other bureaucratic actors 
that Martinez mentions to guide space policy towards development objectives in the 1990s 
and early 2000s; however, this initial absence of pressure towards security does not fully 
explain South Africa’s near-complete focus on development objectives today.  
After 2003, South Africa avoided the potential disproportionate influence of any 
one government department on space policy by creating an inter-department coordinating 
authority outside of any department’s direct authority. Martinez argues that the DST, 
despite being a relatively minor department, lead South Africa’s space dialogue starting in 
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2003.185 It is worth noting that although the DTI ultimately finalized South Africa’s space 
policy in 2009, under the authorities in the Space Affairs Act of 1993, Martinez credits the 
DST with nurturing the political motivation to formalize South Africa’s space policy.186 
In this situation, the bureaucratic institutions hypothesis predicts that a more powerful 
institution might strongly influence South Africa’s space policy to better meet its space 
requirements. Martinez acknowledges that several government departments had space 
requirements to satisfy, which the departments interpreted as competing mandates; 
however, South Africa prevented any one department from exercising asymmetric 
influence by creating a coordinating authority under the National Research Foundation, 
which already worked across departments as a coordinating agent, outside the control of 
any single department.187 In this sense, no single department could commandeer the 
process of creating space policy, even though the DST was just a minor government 
department.  
This coordinating authority likely had significant influence on the trajectory of 
South Africa’s space policy. As a predecessor to SANSA, South Africa established the 
National Working Group on Space Science & Technology (NWGSST) in 2003 to fill this 
coordinating role.188 Only four government departments originally established the 
NWGSST, but the working group eventually expanded to include input from all South 
African government departments with an interest in space technology.189 Government 
officials created the NWGSST to align space policy with national priorities, “particularly 
with regard to issues of poverty reduction, disaster management, economic development, 
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technological empowerment, and improved quality of life.”190 This statement reveals that 
the bureaucratic institutions hypothesis worked in combination with the domestic political 
priorities hypothesis in this circumstance. South Africa established the NWGSST to exert 
influence on space policy by guiding departmental discussions toward South Africa’s 
political priorities. Since the NWGSST was central to directing discussions on space 
applications between a wide range of government departments as the DTI formulated the 
National Space Policy, it is almost certain that the working group effectively influenced 
South Africa’s space policy to become what it is today.  
In addition to the NWGSST, South Africa further removed the potential for 
bureaucratic influence from any single government department by separating user 
requirements from provider capabilities. While the NWGSST determined what space 
capacity South Africa could provide, government officials created a Government Lead 
Users’ Group (GLU) to determine what space applications government departments 
required.191 The GLU ultimately considered the requirements of 16 bureaucratic 
institutions, compiling a comprehensive list of necessary EO data.192 By separating 
conversations about user requirements from those of provider capabilities, South Africa 
ensured that a potential user of space technology could not dictate how South Africa’s 
space program would fulfill those requirements. In short, government institutions that 
benefited from space technology could not influence South Africa’s space policy, since the 
space policy itself clearly dictated how the necessary space capacity would be created. 
Even the DTI and DST, as individual government departments, do not have 
complete authority over the direction of South Africa’s space program. Martinez reveals 
that South Africa deliberately integrated the inputs of all relevant government departments 
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when creating the National Space Policy in an approach called cooperative governance.193 
Cooperative governance includes separating space regulation, under the DTI, from space 
implementation with the DST, thereby preventing “a situation where a single agency of 
government is the rule-maker, referee and dominant player in space activities.”194 
Considering the deliberate and repeated decisions to divide the power of government 
institutions for dictating space policy, it appears that government officials in South Africa 
effectively mitigated the influence of individual government institutions during the 
formalization of space policy in the late 2000s, with the intentional exceptions of the 
NWGSST and GLU.  
By the time the Department of Defence once again expressed interest in South 
Africa’s space program with the Kondor-E contract in 2006, there were already several 
checks on the Department of Defence’s ability to influence space policy. Furthermore, 
there is no evidence in Martinez’ article, which describes the evolution of space policy 
during this time frame, to suggest that the Department of Defence or SANDF, as 
institutions, attempted to exert influence on South Africa’s space policy in order to push 
the Kondor-E contract through.195 This evidence suggests that the bureaucratic institutions 
hypothesis is not the best explanation for South Africa’s limited security space objectives.  
In summary, there is only weak support for the bureaucratic institutions hypothesis 
in the case of South Africa. Initially, the dismantling of South Africa’s first space program, 
and the military’s disinterest in space activity likely removed bureaucratic pressure towards 
security-focused objectives. Development-oriented bureaucratic actors could then establish 
South Africa’s contemporary space program without any security bias, which partially 
supports this hypothesis, but does not fully explain the long-term focus of South Africa’s 
space program on development. Most importantly, during South Africa’s space policy 
formalization, in the late 2000s, government officials repeatedly created institutions to 
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restrict any single government department from taking control of South Africa’s space 
policy, which strongly refutes this hypothesis. 
4. Economic Capacity 
The economic capacity hypothesis focuses on describing how a county’s economy 
and space budget might affect the security-versus-development space policy decision. 
Specifically, this hypothesis predicts that low levels of economic capacity will force a 
country to pick between security- or development-focused space policies by limiting 
funding to pursue both. Furthermore, countries with low economic capacity may favor the 
development option because development-focused space programs can potentially create 
related economic benefits. To assess the strength of this hypothesis for explaining the 
trajectory of South Africa’s space policy, this section searches for evidence in two 
scenarios. First, looking at South Africa’s overall economy, this hypothesis seeks to 
determine how changes in economic capacity might affect South Africa’s space budget. 
Second, to find support for the economic capacity hypothesis, the evidence must 
demonstrate that changes in South Africa’s space budget influence decisions surrounding 
space policy objectives. In other words, has the amount of economic resources available 
for space activities impacted South Africa’s space policy?  
During the first few years of South Africa’s contemporary space program in the 
early 1990s, it is possible that concerns over economic capacity partially contributed to the 
initial government decision to direct space policy towards development objectives. 
President de Klerk had initiated political reforms to revive South Africa’s faltering 
economy, and the ANC’s primary focus after the 1994 election was economic rebirth.196 
Put differently, government officials perceived South Africa’s weak economic capacity as 
constraining, or even threatening. Economic statistics support the argument that South 
Africa’s economic capacity was low during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1981, South 
Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita peaked at $6,895 before dropping 20% 
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to a relative minimum at $5,517 in 1993.197 Thus, South Africa was in a period of 
economic constraint when government officials passed the Space Affairs Act of 1993, 
which likely forced officials to pick between security and development objectives. It is not 
likely that government officials would spend scarce financial resources to rebuild the 
recently dismantled launch program. Consequently, South African space leaders in the 
early 1990s could reasonably spend money to develop a satellite-based space program with 
security or development objectives. South Africa’s limited economic capacity at the time 
possibly incentivized the development choice, since development satellites possess the 
potential to return economic benefits. In this sense, South Africa’s limited economic 
capacity possibly contributed to the purely development-focused trajectory that the Space 
Affairs Act initiated. This initial possible connection, however, does not fully explain 
South Africa’s continued focus on development objectives.  
Despite South Africa’s many enduring socioeconomic challenges in the 21st century, 
the economy—with relatively high levels of diversity, industrialization, and income—is 
continually cited as one of the most-developed on the continent.198 Put simply, South Africa 
has significant economic capacity, at least compared to other African countries. In this sense, 
South Africa is likely not as constrained in its space policy by economic capacity as other 
African countries, which allows South Africa more freedom to pick security, development, or 
some combination of space objectives. This level of capacity is partially the result of substantial 
growth since the end of apartheid in 1994; however, South Africa has also experienced three 
economic recessions during this period: the first from 2008 to 2009, the second in 2018, and 
the third starting in 2020.199 Economic recessions place government spending in a spotlight, 
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potentially focusing on space program spending, which is already contentious in Africa.200 
Surprisingly, South Africa’s space spending does not decrease during economic recessions, 
despite the potential for additional scrutiny.  
Space funding data during the 2008 recession reveals that broader economic 
pressures likely did not influence space policy decisions during the contemporary space 
program’s formative years. It is difficult to precisely determine South Africa’s space 
budget during the 2008 recession because SANSA was not fully operational yet. Still, 
analyzing the DST’s budget with respect to space activity gives some insight into how 
space funding reacted to economic constraints during this time. The DST’s 2009 annual 
report reveals that space science funding actually increased from the 2007–2008 fiscal year 
to the 2008–2009 fiscal year by almost 18%, starting at 37.6 million rand and ending at 
44.3 million rand.201 Over the same timeframe, funding for the SKA almost tripled from 
105.5 million rand to 289.8 million rand.202 In the following fiscal year, which includes 
2010, both space science and the SKA significantly increased funding again, to 62.2 
million rand and 502.3 million rand respectively.203 The increase in space funding from 
2008 to 2010 indicates that South Africa’s space program did not experience budgetary 
pressure, despite the broader economic recession. Furthermore, none of the budget 
speeches between 2008 and 2010 highlight space spending, suggesting that space activity 
was not an economically contentious issue during the 2008 recession.204 Consequently, 
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South Africa’s recession probably did not constrain space policy decisions during this 
formative time around the 2008 recession, leaving both security-focused and development-
focused objectives open as possibilities.  
Circumstances in 2018 demonstrate once again, that South Africa’s economic 
recessions do not automatically result in less space spending, which would potentially 
pressure space policy to choose between development or security objectives. Space 
spending during the 2018 recession is consolidated in SANSA’s annual reports. In the 
2016–2017 fiscal year, before the coming recession, SANSA received 125 million rand 
from the South African parliament in the form of grants.205 During the recession, in the 
2017–2018 and 2018–2019 fiscal years, the amount that SANSA received from parliament 
increased to 131 million rand and 138 million rand respectively.206 These statistics indicate 
that South Africa’s parliament did not decrease national space spending during the 2018 
recession, despite broader economic pressure, which is a similar result to the 2008 
recession. In this sense, the South African government did not allow decreasing economic 
capacity to influence SANSA’s space activities. SANSA’s revenue, however, consists of 
more than just parliamentary grants.  
Even with SANSA’s total revenue decreasing during the 2018 recession, SANSA’s 
sizeable budget surpluses further suggest that the space agency did not experience financial 
pressure during this time. The space agency’s revenue includes non-parliamentary grants 
in addition to parliamentary grants, which combine as non-exchange revenue, and contract 
revenue in exchange for services.207 Unlike SANSA’s parliamentary revenue, the total 
revenue decreased between 2016 and 2019. In the 2016–2017 fiscal year SANSA’s total 
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revenue was 471 million rand.208 The total revenue declined to 433 million rand in 2017–
2018, and again to 359 million rand in 2018–2019.209 Regardless, SANSA operated with 
a sizeable budget surplus of no less than 72 million rand throughout all three of these fiscal 
years, which, put simply, means that SANSA’s total governmental and non-governmental 
revenue exceeded the space agency’s expenditures.210 The surplus, despite falling total 
revenue, suggests that SANSA did not broadly experience financial pressure during the 
2018 recession, even as South Africa’s overall economic capacity collapsed. Despite the 
evidence from the past two recessions that economic capacity did not meaningfully 
pressure space spending, it is still important to determine if constrained space spending 
could influence space policy.  
Funding constraints surrounding South Africa’s next satellite demonstrate the 
potential for economic capacity to stop the growth of new space projects, and potentially, 
direct future policy. SANSA’s 2018–2019 annual performance review provides some 
insight into how space policy reacts to financial constraints on space spending. Looking at 
SANSA’s 14 key performance indicators (KPI) the report notes that SANSA failed to 
achieve the objectives of two KPIs because of financial constraints.211 Specifically, both 
KPIs relate to the growth of South Africa’s space sector through the development of 
EOSat-1, for which SANSA did not receive funding.212 EOSat-1 is South Africa’s next 
EO satellite, with a primarily development-focused mission of monitoring agricultural 
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land, although EO technology could serve dual-use purposes.213 This satellite will fulfill 
South Africa’s role in the African Resource Management Satellite Constellation (ARMS-
C), which is an intra-African satellite constellation that also focuses on development 
objectives like land use, resource management, and disaster monitoring.214 In this 
situation, South Africa’s economic capacity does not provide enough space funding to 
support space capacity growth. As such, financial constraints are preventing South Africa 
from meeting several development-focused objectives through the EOSat-1 project. While 
this single example does not determine if space budgetary constraints usually inhibit the 
advancement of development-focused projects, it does demonstrate that budgets can stop 
individual future projects. In South Africa’s case, it appears that periods of reduced 
economic capacity can maintain existing space policies and projects, but can also prevent 
the growth of space capacity by halting future projects.  
Overall, there is little, if any, support for the economic capacity hypothesis in South 
Africa. Limited economic capacity during the apartheid transition in the early 1990s may 
have contributed to the government’s initial development-focused space policy decisions, 
but this hypothesis does not convincingly explain South Africa’s long-term focus on 
development objectives. Multiple recent economic recessions emphasize that declining 
national economic capacity does not automatically correspond with a decrease in the 
overall space budget. Financial constraints, when they do occur in South Africa, may 
neglect space program growth, while maintaining existing space projects and policies. 
Thus, the analysis reveals that economic capacity constraints may only marginally affect 
space programs by pausing funding for specific programs. Still, it is inconclusive if the 
marginal influence of economic capacity could actually move the trajectory of South 
Africa’s space policy.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown how South Africa’s space program, once heavily focused 
on military use, has, since the 1990s, become nearly entirely focused on development. With 
the exception of the Kondor-E satellite, South Africa’s contemporary space program 
includes no tangible steps towards security-focused objectives. Of the four hypotheses that 
this chapter examines, the evidence strongly supports the political prioritization hypothesis 
as the best explanation for South Africa’s space policy. The South African government has 
had a high degree of agency in deciding the trajectory of its space program. International, 
bureaucratic, or economic influences may contribute marginally to South Africa’s 
development-focused space policy, but the final path seems to follow the country’s political 
priorities. Table 1 summarizes the analysis of all four hypotheses.  
Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses for South Africa’s Space Program 
Hypothesis Level of 
Support 
Key Findings 
Foreign Partnerships No Support 
Domestic capacity and multiple 
partners prevent over reliance on any 
single partner 
Political Prioritization Strong Space policy consistently aligned with ANC’s political priorities 
Bureaucratic Institutions Weak 
Officials established checks and 
balances against bureaucratic influence 
early 
Economic Capacity No Support Declining economic capacity has not constrained space budgets 
 
In the next chapter, I turn to the case of Nigeria’s space program, which differs 
considerably from South Africa’s in terms of its history, objectives, and technologies. Not 
only is Nigeria’s space program newer, but it has evolved in the opposite way as South 
Africa’s from a more development-focused to a more security-focused program. The 
differences between the space programs in South Africa and Nigeria make comparing both 
cases important, since the Nigerian case study can help assess the consistency of the results 
from the South African case.  
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III. NIGERIA’S SPACE PROGRAM 
A. OVERVIEW 
Nigeria’s space program is one of the oldest and most advanced on the continent. 
When the Nigerian government first established the space program in the 1990s, the 
program’s objectives overwhelmingly focused on using space technology to advance 
Nigeria’s socioeconomic development. Over a decade later, as the regional terrorist threat 
grew in the 2010s, Nigeria’s space program began to incorporate security-focused 
objectives while preserving the program’s development goals. As a result of this shift, 
Nigeria’s space program is now dual-use, incorporating both security and development 
elements.  
This chapter examines this shift in Nigeria’s space program in two steps. First, I 
describe Nigeria’s space history. Next, I analyze the four hypotheses—foreign 
partnerships, political prioritization, bureaucratic institutions, and economic capacity—to 
determine which factors best explain the trajectory of Nigeria’s space history. The 
evaluated evidence reveals that Nigeria’s political priorities primarily drove Nigeria’s 
space policy decisions. There is either weak or no support in the existing evidence for the 
remaining hypotheses. Ultimately, the consistent alignment between Nigeria’s general 
political priorities and the space program’s objectives best explains why Nigeria’s space 
decision makers pursued development first, and then a more balanced approach, to include 
security objectives.  
B. UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORY 
OF NIGERIA’S SPACE HISTORY 
Nigeria’s space history can be broken down into two general periods. First, from 
the 1990s until 2010, Nigeria founded its space program and began to implement 
development-oriented policies. This foundational period aligned with Nigeria’s transition 
from a military dictatorship to a civilian democracy in 1999, and the initial years of 
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Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.215 Then, from 2011 until the present day, the second period in 
Nigeria’s space history, the space program gradually incorporated more security objectives 
to supplement the continued socioeconomic efforts. These security applications focused on 
combating the expanding regional terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and the Islamic 
State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). This section describes Nigeria’s space history, and 
explains how the space program shifted its position on the security-development spectrum. 
1. Space for Nigeria’s Development: 1995–2010 
Although Nigeria’s government first declared its desire to participate in space 
activities in 1976, there were no tangible steps towards establishing a space program until 
the 1990s.216 Nigerian government officials approved the country’s first space institution, 
the National Centre for Remote Sensing (NCRS), in 1988, but NCRS did not become 
operational until 1995.217 NCRS’s mission, once operational, was to use remote-sensing 
technology to monitor Nigeria’s natural resources and environment.218 In other words, the 
primary purpose of NCRS was to monitor resources that could contribute to Nigeria’s 
economic growth and to reduce the socioeconomic impact of environmental crises. The 
NCRS’s time in Nigeria’s space spotlight, however, was short lived because the Nigerian 
government created its National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) 
just four years later in 1999, and NCRS became one of NASRDA’s research centers.219 
Nigeria’s primary space institution, NASRDA, was established with a broader 
mission than NCRS. In 1999, a draft national space policy, formulated by the National 
Agency for Science and Engineering Infrastructure (NASENI) motivated Nigerian 
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government officials to create NASRDA.220 NASRDA fell under the Ministry of Science 
and Technology and was established with a “broad objective to pursue the development 
and application of space science and technology for the socio-economic benefits of the 
nation.”221 Establishing NASRDA as an agency within the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, which broadly used science and technology to advance socioeconomic 
development, almost certainly started NASRDA with an institutional bias that was geared 
toward development.222 Notably, NASRDA operated six research centers to accomplish 
its objectives. Table 2 names the six NASRDA centers and describes each center’s 
mandate.  
Table 2. NASRDA’s Research Centers and Mandates223 
Research Center Mandate 
Centre for Remote Sensing, Jos Research, development, and operation of EO and remote sensing data and systems  
Centre for Satellite Technology 
Development, Abuja Manufacturing and development of satellites 
Centre for Geodesy and 
Geodynamics, Toro 
Analysis of remote sensing data to monitor 
seismic activity, land use, and natural resources 
Centre for Space Transport and 
Propulsion, Epe Building domestic space launch capacity 
Centre for Basic Space Science 
and Astronomy, Nsukka 
Studying the space environment and space 
phenomenon 
Centre for Space Science 
Technology Education, Ile-Ife Developing space-related human capital 
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In 2001, the Nigerian Federal Executive Council approved the National Space 
Policy, which remains the guiding strategy document for Nigeria’s space program. Drafted 
by NASENI, the policy established the initial objectives of Nigeria’s space program, which 
broadly stressed the importance of creating a space program for the purpose of 
socioeconomic development.224 For example, the National Space Policy stated, “Nigeria 
shall vigorously pursue the attainment of Space Capabilities as an essential tool for its 
socio-economic development and the enhancement of the quality of life of its people.”225 
Furthermore, seven of the space policy’s eight applications for space technology included 
development goals like improving agriculture, discovering natural resources, mitigating 
disasters, and advancing education.226  
Despite the larger focus on development, however, the National Space Policy also 
established explicit security objectives. For example, the eighth and final application for 
space capabilities in the National Space Policy was “National Defence and Security.”227 
In particular, the security objectives included providing reliable navigation information for 
military operations, improving intelligence collection, and enhancing command and 
control.228 Thus, Nigeria’s earliest stated space objectives demonstrated a broad focus on 
development, while also recognizing the security-related benefits of a space program. 
Nigeria’s first satellite, NigeriaSat-1—launched in 2003 by a Russian Kosmos-3M 
rocket from Plesetsk, Russia—had the goal to reduce the socioeconomic impact of 
disasters.229 Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL), a British-based space company, 
built the $13 million microsatellite and trained several Nigerian engineers throughout the 
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process.230 The primary payload on NigeriaSat-1 was a MSI optimized for disaster 
monitoring.231 With a 32-meter ground resolution, the imager could only reliably resolve 
large natural features like rivers, forests, and mountains. NigeriaSat-1 was one of five 
satellites in the international Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC), which aimed to 
improve global disaster monitoring, and included the United Kingdom, China, Algeria, 
Nigeria, Turkey, Thailand, and Vietnam as participants.232 Put simply, NigeriaSat-1’s 
primary objective was to reduce the negative consequences of disasters, like Hurricane 
Katrina, the 2004 Southern Asian Tsunami, and persistent Nigerian deforestation, by 
providing images of a disaster’s impact.233 
The Nigerian Federal Executive Council also approved a 25-year roadmap for 
Nigeria’s space program in 2006, which serves as another example of Nigeria’s initial 
orientation towards development-focused space objectives, albeit with some room for 
security-focused applications.234 This 25-year space roadmap included four primary goals: 
1) training a Nigerian astronaut by 2015, 2) manufacturing a satellite in Nigeria by 2018, 
3) domestically launching a Nigerian satellite by 2025, and 4) landing a Nigerian astronaut 
on the Moon by 2030.235 The first and fourth goals aimed to advance space exploration by 
training and flying a Nigerian astronaut. Chizea Francis, a NASRDA official, explains that 
space exploration in Nigeria was development-focused because human exploration 
missions help transform advanced space technology into terrestrial products that may 
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benefit the national economy.236 The remaining two goals—manufacturing a satellite in 
Nigeria and domestically launching a Nigerian satellite—were neutral on the security-
development spectrum without additional context. Building satellite manufacturing 
capacity could benefit security, development, or dual-use objectives, depending on the 
technologies employed on each Nigerian satellite. Similarly, domestic launch capabilities 
could support satellite launches, commercial companies, and military missile development 
simultaneously.  
In 2007, a Chinese Long March—3B rocket launched Nigeria’s second satellite, 
NigComSat-1,  from Xichang, China.237 NigComSat-1 was a communications satellite and 
the first sub-Saharan African satellite to be placed into GEO.238 Nigerian government 
officials contracted the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) to develop and 
build NigComSat-1, which originally had a planned 15-year operational lifetime.239 The 
Nigerian Ministry of Communications established a government-owned company, 
Nigerian Communications Satellite Limited (NIGCOMSAT), to operate NigComSat-1 and 
future government communications satellites for socioeconomic benefits.240 NigComSat-
1 had 28 transponders across four communication frequency bands, but a solar array 
malfunction caused the satellite to fail in 2008, at which point it was left in a graveyard 
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orbit.241 NigComSat-1, like any communications satellite, had a vast array of potential 
applications, both for security- and development-focused purposes. Given NigComSat-1’s 
short operational lifespan, and the absence of evidence to determine how Nigeria used the 
satellite during operation, the location of NigComSat-1 on the security-development 
spectrum is unclear, but likely dual-use. 
Finally, NASRDA’s governing legislation, the National Space Research and 
Development Act of 2010, provided opportunities for both security and development space 
objectives. This legislation listed 13 functions for Nigeria’s space program, of which only 
one specifically aimed to advance Nigeria’s socioeconomic development.242 The 
remaining 12 functions ambiguously sought to build space capacity without specifying 
underlying objectives, which made the space program adaptable.243 The NASRDA Act 
did not radically depart from NASRDA’s previous development-focused objectives, but 
rather, the legislation included flexibility for the pursuit of both security- and development-
focused objectives later in Nigeria’s space program evolution.  
Initially, Nigeria’s space program was clearly oriented towards the development 
side of the security-development spectrum. The National Space Policy, in particular, 
demonstrated a strong preference for space applications that would improve Nigeria’s 
socioeconomic position. As Nigeria’s space program approached the end of its first two 
decades, the program grew more mixed in its ambitions. Put simply, Nigeria’s space 
program opened to permit both security- and development-focused goals. Still, explicit 
examples of security-focused objectives, institutions, and technology were outliers in 
Nigeria’s space program through 2010.  
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2. A Growing Focus on Security: 2011-Present 
The second period of Nigeria’s space history began in 2011 with a series of satellite 
launches. During this second period, Nigeria sustained previous development-focused 
space applications. It also established projects and institutions with tangible security-
related benefits, rather than simply acknowledging opportunities for security objectives, as 
in the first period. Nigeria’s third and fourth satellites, NigeriaSat-2 and NigeriaSat-X, both 
launched onboard the same Russian Dnepr rocket out of Yasniy, Russia, in August, 
2011.244 Government officials once again contracted SSTL to build the satellites in 
England, although the contract specified that Nigerian engineers would completely develop 
NigeriaSat-X with supervision and training from SSTL.245 NigeriaSat-2’s primary payload 
was a MSI with a ground resolution of 2.5 meters.246 Additionally, NigeriaSat-2 had a 
second imager that was extremely similar to NigeriaSat-1’s MSI, with the same ground 
resolution of 32 meters.247 Likewise, the primary payload on NigeriaSat-X was an updated 
version of NigeriaSat-1’s imager that improved the ground resolution to 22 meters.248  
NigeriaSat-2 and NigeriaSat-X accomplished five primary objectives. First, both 
satellites replaced the aging NigeriaSat-1, which ended operations in 2012, as participants 
in the DMC.249 Second, NigeriaSat-2’s imagery resolution met the 2.5-meter requirement 
to fulfill Nigeria’s commitment to ARMS-C, which is an African EO data-sharing 
agreement designed to make information about land use, resource management, and 
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disaster monitoring broadly accessible to ARMS-C participants.250 Third, NigeriaSat-X 
provided an opportunity to develop Nigeria’s space capacity and human capital by training 
Nigerian engineers on the entire satellite development process.251 Fourth, imagery from 
both satellites contributed to the National Geospatial Data Infrastructure program in 
Nigeria, which is an effort to standardize and broaden access to geospatial data within 
Nigeria.252 Fifth and finally, the 2.5-meter resolution of NigeriaSat-2’s imager, despite its 
primary purpose of supporting ARMS-C, also allowed security forces to track people and 
equipment.253 In fact, Oyewole states that NigeriaSat-2 was “designed and managed for 
civil purposes but significantly employed for military purposes.”254 For example, the 
Nigerian Air Force used imagery from NigeriaSat-2 to analyze terrain in Niger at the site 
of a jet crash, presumably to aid a search and rescue mission.255 In this sense, NigeriaSat-
2 served a dual-use mission, while NigeriaSat-X was more focused on development.  
Nigeria’s fifth satellite, NigComSat-1R, launched just four months later in 
December, 2011, on a Chinese Long March 3B/E out of Xichang, China.256 NigComSat-
1R was the replacement satellite for NigComSat-1, since the first communication satellite 
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failed in orbit in 2008.257 Considering that NigComSat-1 failed well before its 15-year 
planned operational lifetime due to a solar panel malfunction, NIGCOMSAT and CGWIC 
agreed that NigComSat-1’s insurance policy would cover the development, launch, and 
orbital delivery costs for NigComSat-1R without additional funding from Nigeria.258 In 
replacing NigComSat-1, CGWIC developed NigComSat-1R to be virtually identical to 
NigComSat-1, with 28 transponders across four communication frequency bands, while 
including minor improvements to prevent a similar failure.259 The four frequency bands 
allowed for a range of dual-use applications, which included television, internet, tele-
medicine, tele-education, security, and surveillance.260 Similar to NigeriaSat-2, however, 
Nigeria frequently uses NigComSat-1R for military purposes, according to Oyewole.261  
In 2013, Nigeria established the National Space Council to monitor NASRDA’s 
implementation of space policy. The concept of a National Space Council existed as early 
as 2001, when the National Space Policy proposed creating a space council, with the 
Nigerian president as the chairman, for “the development of the nation’s policy guidelines 
on space activities.”262 Then, in 2010, the NASRDA Act granted the National Space 
Council the power to control NASRDA’s financial activity, approve NASRDA’s 
partnerships, procure space-related technical support for NASRDA, and license all 
Nigerian space activity.263 With the legal and policy framework in place, President 
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Goodluck Jonathan formally established the National Space Council in 2013.264 The 
National Space Council’s role and responsibilities, which consisted primarily of overseeing 
and facilitating NASRDA operations, indicated a focus on development-oriented space 
applications, since NASRDA’s continued goal is to advance socioeconomic development.  
Nigeria made its commitment to security objectives in its space program more 
explicit in 2014, when government officials established the Defence Space Administration 
(DSA), which is Nigeria’s second space agency. Like the National Space Council, the 
National Space Policy had planned for a Defence Space Command under the Ministry of 
Defence in 2001, but government officials did not follow this guidance until the mid-
2010s.265 In 2014, the Nigerian government finally established the DSA, and then, in 2016, 
government officials passed the DSA Act, which was the legislative backbone of the 
DSA.266 The DSA’s mission was to “support the armed forces of Nigeria and other security 
agencies with relevant space products and solutions necessary for the conduct of operations 
in peace and wartime.”267 Nigeria’s space institutions and stated objectives had recognized 
the benefits of security-related space activities since 2001, but the DSA’s establishment in 
2014 demonstrates an explicit push toward security-focused objectives. 
Additionally, in 2014, the Centre for Space Transport and Propulsion (CSTP) began 
to experiment with rocket technology—another move toward a more security-focused 
space program. In 2006, Nigeria’s 25-year space roadmap had established the goal to 
domestically launch Nigerian satellites. CSTP expanded upon this objective by aiming to 
develop a launch program capable of putting satellites in both LEO and GEO orbits by 
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2030, along with sending probes to interplanetary space in the same timeframe.268 Since 
2014, CSTP has conducted over 30 rocket tests, none of which have ascended beyond 10 
kilometers.269 It is interesting that CSTP used solid rocket fuel (SRF) in its rocket tests 
because SRF is typically better suited to missile applications than orbital launch 
vehicles.270 In fact, since 2016, the Nigerian Air Force and DSA have developed guided 
missiles in a partnership with CSTP.271 Perhaps this connection between military missiles 
and CSTP helps to explain the level of secrecy surrounding Nigeria’s launch program.272  
Finally, in 2017, the program saw to the launch of NigeriaEduSat-1, Nigeria’s sixth 
and most recent satellite. This satellite, also known as Bird-N, launched on a Falcon 9 out 
of Florida in 2017.273 The Nigerian Federal University of Technology, Akure, working 
with Japan’s Kyushu Institute of Technology, developed NigeriaEduSat-1 as one of five 
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CubeSats in an international constellation called Birds-1, which included satellites from 
Japan, Nigeria, Ghana, Bangladesh, and Mongolia.274 NigeriaEduSat-1 served three 
primary purposes. First, and most importantly, this CubeSat aimed to build space capacity 
in Nigeria’s university system in order to inspire STEM education and create related 
socioeconomic development benefits.275 Part of this first objective included uploading 
popular music to NigeriaEduSat-1 and transmitting the songs to radio operators.276 
NigeriaEduSat-1’s second objective was to take images of Nigeria with a 5 megapixel 
imager and a 0.3 megapixel imager onboard.277 Finally, NigeriaEduSat-1 measured 
atmospheric density in LEO as its orbit decayed from an initial altitude of approximately 
400 kilometers.278 
Overall, since 2011, it is clear that Nigeria’s space institutions and technology have 
increasingly supported explicit security objectives, even though there have not been any 
written policy updates. Specifically, the growing importance of security in Nigeria’s space 
technology has taken two routes: dual-use satellite programs and military missile research. 
Nigeria’s space program still includes development objectives, like STEM education in 
NigeriaEduSat-1, but the program now contains activities that advance both security and 
development objectives. Thus, over the last three decades, Nigeria’s space program has 
shifted from a program that was primarily development-oriented, to one that incorporates 
both security and development institutions and technology in approximately equal 
measure.  
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C. EXAMINING THE HYPOTHESES 
The remainder of this chapter analyzes why the Nigerian government initially 
established a space program that was focused on development in the 1990s, before 
incorporating security objectives in the 2010s. Following the approach laid out in Chapter 
I and applied to South Africa in Chapter II, I explore four possible answers to this question: 
foreign influence, political priorities, bureaucratic interests, and economic capacity. The 
evidence in this section demonstrates that only political priorities have had a clear influence 
on the trajectory of Nigeria’s space program. 
1. Foreign Security and Development Partnerships 
The foreign security and development partnerships hypothesis seeks to determine 
if foreign partnerships influenced the trajectory of Nigeria’s space program from a 
development-focused space program initially to one that balanced between development 
and security after 2010. Specifically, if Nigeria relied on international space partners for 
either technology transfer or launch capacity there may have been opportunities for foreign 
influence. These opportunities would be especially strong in the foundational years of 
Nigeria’s space program, when there was limited institutional inertia but a high degree of 
dependency on foreign space technology.  
Early in Nigeria’s space history, government officials repeatedly solicited foreign 
partners for help in developing the country’s space program. Nigeria’s military 
government, for example, expressed interest in receiving technical foreign assistance after 
establishing its first space institution, NCRS, in 1988.279 Later, in 2000, Nigeria’s Vice 
President Abubakar publicly requested launch support and technical assistance from more 
advanced space countries, just one year after the Nigerian government established 
NASRDA, citing the Nigerian-United Kingdom partnership on NigeriaSat-1 as a positive 
                                                 








collaboration.280 Furthermore, the Director of NASRDA, Professor Boroffice, told 
Russian representatives in 2001 that implementing the National Space Policy with a focus 
on socioeconomic development would require international support.281 Thus, it is clear 
that domestic leaders were actively requesting foreign support in the initial years of 
Nigeria’s space program. These requests demonstrate that Nigerian leaders first formulated 
national space objectives or institutions before soliciting foreign assistance to help realize 
their objectives, rather than foreign partners pushing specific objectives onto Nigeria’s 
space program. It remains possible, however, that Nigerian leaders designed the space 
program with the requirement for foreign support in mind, favoring objectives that would 
attract international assistance.  
For their part, international space partners answered Nigeria’s requests by 
providing support in terms of both space access and technology development for every 
Nigerian space project to date. For satellite technology, Nigeria has relied on three foreign 
partners to varying extents to produce every Nigerian satellite and educate Nigerian 
engineers on satellite development. Specifically, SSTL helped to build NigeriaSat-1, 
NigeriaSat-2, and NigeriaSat-X; CGWIC developed NigComSat-1 and NigComSat-1R; 
and Japan’s Kyushu Institute of Technology helped manufacture NigeriaEduSat-1. 
Similarly, just three foreign partners have been responsible for launching all of Nigeria’s 
satellites. Russia launched Nigeria’s first three imagery satellites, NigeriaSat-1, 
NigeriaSat-2, and NigeriaSat-X; China placed both communications satellites,  
NigComSat-1 and NigComSat-1R, into GEO; and SpaceX, a U.S. commercial launch 
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company, launched NigeriaEduSat-1. Foreign partners have even assisted Nigeria’s 
domestic launch capacity building efforts, with ten Nigerian engineers receiving rocketry 
training at the Russian Center in Science of Rocketry, while another six Nigerians attended 
the University of Alabama to obtain degrees related to rocketry.282 Put simply, foreign 
partners have been involved, at least in a technical sense, in every Nigerian space 
achievement since the space program started in the 1990s.  
Notably, by the late 2000s, Nigeria’s growing space capacity meant that it relied 
less on foreign partners. Nigerian engineers primarily constructed NigeriaSat-X, thereby 
demonstrating Nigeria’s increasing space capacity in the late 2000s, although the Nigerian 
engineers still utilized support from SSTL facilities and engineers.283 Nigeria’s reduced 
reliance on foreign technology transfer provided foreign partners with fewer opportunities 
to influence Nigeria’s space program.  
Despite extensive foreign involvement, evidence from the Nigerian-United 
Kingdom space partnership does not reveal support for this hypothesis. The United 
Kingdom has been one of Nigeria’s strongest space partners, starting with NigeriaSat-1 in 
2003. Even in this inaugural satellite partnership, however, Nigerian government officials 
included a ground control station in the contract with SSTL, which allowed Nigeria to 
directly control the satellite in orbit and to participate in the DMC as an equal international 
partner with the other constellation member countries.284 Following the success of 
NigeriaSat-1, the British government tried to incentivize future Nigerian contracts with 
SSTL. Specifically, British government officials approved a grant to SSTL, worth about 
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$6.8 million, to help Nigeria build NigComSat-1 in 2003.285 In effect, the grant would have 
acted as a subsidy to the Nigerian space program, allowing SSTL to offer a lower price to 
build NigComSat-1. In 2005, however, NASRDA solicited bids for NigComSat-1 from 21 
international satellite manufacturers, and the United Kingdom did not win the contract.286 
The grant was simply not successful in influencing NASRDA to select SSTL as its partner 
for communications satellites. Regardless of the NigComSat-1 contract, NASRDA and 
SSTL once again partnered to develop NigeriaSat-2 and NigeriaSat-X. Shortly before both 
satellites launched in 2011, NASRDA signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
British company DMC International Imaging Limited to market and sell images taken from 
the satellites.287 This agreement suggests that Nigeria fully controlled the operation of both 
satellites, as well as the international rights to the satellites’ images. Moreover, Seidu 
Mohammed, the director of NASRDA, explicitly clarified in a 2013 interview that 
Nigeria’s space program had not accepted any money from the United Kingdom, removing 
any doubts of British foreign influence in Nigeria’s space program.288 
The extent of China’s influence on the trajectory of Nigeria’s space policy is less 
clear. Starting in the early 2000s, China began to drastically expand its economic relations 
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with Nigeria.289 In the space sector specifically, China’s growing involvement in Nigeria 
fostered an enduring partnership that centered on communications satellites. In 2005, 
China’s Exim Bank supplied a $200 million loan to Nigeria for the construction and launch 
of NigComSat-1, while the Nigerian government provided the remaining $51 million.290 
Simultaneously, NASRDA also awarded the NigComSat-1 contract to CGWIC.291 Just 
one year later, in 2006, China and Nigeria signed a strategic partnership agreement which 
highlighted the telecommunications sector as an area of interest for Chinese investment, 
among other sectors.292 While the next hypothesis shows that space-based 
communications were an important part of a domestic political program to spur 
socioeconomic development, China’s $200 million loan and strategic partnership 
agreement suggest that Nigeria’s space-based communications were also important to 
Chinese foreign policy in Nigeria. In fact, NigComSat-1 was “an important milestone for 
China, the first time it had designed, built and launched a satellite for another country.”293 
Although Nigeria’s broader economic agenda suggested a Nigerian interest in 
communications satellite technology irrespective of Chinese financing, it is possible that 
the Nigerian space program might have required China’s sizeable loan to execute its 
communications objectives. In other words, Chinese financing may have allowed the 
Nigerian space program to pursue NigComSat-1, but it is unlikely that China provided the 
initial motivation for the satellite.  
After NigComSat-1 failed in orbit in 2008, China remained involved in the 
communications sector of Nigeria’s space program. A technical error caused NigComSat-
1 to fail just one year into its 15-year expected lifespan, which undermined China’s efforts 
to establish an international reputation of reliability in satellite manufacturing.294 It is thus 
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unsurprising that CGWIC used an insurance policy to cover the costs of building and 
launching NigComSat-1R.295 From this perspective, it is apparent that China’s 
involvement in NigComSat-1R was primarily focused on the international reputation of the 
Chinese aerospace industry. Still, Barbosa indicates that Nigeria’s continued space 
partnership with China was not a foregone conclusion when he writes “China Aerospace 
Science and Technology Corporation…reached a decision to build and launch 
NIGCOMSAT-1R with no extra cost.”296 It is possible that China offered insurance 
funding as an incentive for NASRDA to continue pursuing satellite communications with 
CGWIC, thereby allowing the Chinese aerospace industry to redeem itself.  
Then, in 2018, Chinese investment allowed Nigeria to continue pursuing satellite 
communications. In 2017, Minister of Communications Shittu approached the Nigerian 
Senate with a request for two new communications satellites, citing the need for backup 
satellites to the aging NigComSat-1R in order to build confidence in the reliability of 
Nigeria’s satellite communications.297 Shittu argued that a $550 million loan would make 
both satellites affordable, but this high cost sparked a debate about the merits of purchasing 
redundant communications satellites during a recession.298 Once again, China’s Exim 
Bank provided financing to make both satellites feasible for Nigeria, this time purchasing 
almost a 50% equity stake in NIGCOMSAT for the price of $550 million in 2018.299 In 
this sense, Chinese investment made it possible for Nigeria’s space program to continue 
advancing communications applications, since it seems unlikely that the Senate would have 
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approved another large satellite loan. Still, Shittu approached the Nigerian government 
with his proposal before initiating negotiations with China’s Exim Bank, which suggests 
that Chinese influence did not provide the original motivation for the acquisition of two 
more communications satellites.300 Notably, China’s equity stake in NIGCOMSAT will 
likely increase Chinese influence in Nigeria’s space program as the deal progresses, since 
equity ownership transforms China’s role from external partner and financier to active 
internal participant. In total, the extent of China’s influence on Nigeria’s space program is 
unclear. It is likely that Chinese financing has repeatedly allowed Nigeria’s space program 
to both establish and develop its communications objectives. In this sense, China has 
probably shaped the trajectory of Nigeria’s space program; however, the available evidence 
also suggests that Nigeria’s domestic actors provided the impetus to strive for space-based 
communications in the first place. Put simply, China likely provided the financial engine 
that Nigeria needed to develop satellite communications.  
Although British and Chinese involvement did not fundamentally drive Nigeria’s 
space policy, Nigeria’s relationship with the U.S. at least partially illustrates why Nigeria’s 
space program shifted to include both security and development objectives in the 2010s. 
Throughout the 2010s a new security threat emerged in Nigeria and the surrounding region. 
Two Salafist terrorist groups, Boko Haram and ISWAP, quickly grew in 2009 and 2015 
respectively.301 Although these terrorist organizations were not the only security threats in 
Nigeria, they have captured international attention over the last decade, resulting in 
significant foreign security assistance to Nigeria’s neighboring countries.302 
Consequently, there has been international pressure on Nigeria, and the surrounding 
countries to contain these two groups. During the rise in terrorist activity in Nigeria, 
concerns over human rights abuses in the Nigerian military impeded U.S. security 
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assistance to Nigeria, which remained extremely low in the early 2010s despite the U.S. 
focus on combatting terrorism in the region.303 After the Nigerian public elected President 
Buhari in 2015, however, the Buhari administration instituted a series of reforms to address 
human rights abuses in the military, reduce corruption, and improve Nigeria’s 
counterinsurgency efforts.304  
A rare act of U.S. security assistance to Nigeria prior to 2015 possibly motivated 
the Nigerian government to use space applications to assist counterinsurgency efforts. 
When the U.S. provided satellite imagery to the Nigerian government to help locate 200 
kidnapped schoolgirls in May of 2014, several Nigerian space critics began to publicly 
question why Nigeria’s space program could not have provided these images itself.305 Just 
five months later, the Nigerian government established DSA, which represented an explicit 
push for applying Nigeria’s existing space technology towards security objectives.306 
Considering that the National Space Policy had recommended creating a Defence Space 
Command since 2001, the embarrassment of needing foreign satellite imagery helps to 
explain DSA’s timing. In the following years, Nigeria’s space program played an important 
role in improving Nigeria’s counterinsurgency efforts and professionalizing the military 
under Buhari’s reforms. For example, the 2016 partnership between the Nigerian Air Force, 
DSA, and CSTP facilitated the development of guided bombs and missiles that the 
Nigerian military used to fight Boko Haram.307 Additionally, the Nigerian military relied 
on satellite communications as Boko Haram tried to destroy telecommunication 
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infrastructure around Lake Chad.308 Finally, NASRDA and NIGCOMSAT continually 
train Nigerian service members on the military applications of satellite technology to assist 
the fight against Boko Haram.309 Thus, it is possible that U.S. security assistance indirectly 
triggered a chain of security objectives in Nigeria’s space program by creating domestic 
controversy.  
Overall, there is only weak support for the foreign partnerships hypothesis in 
Nigeria. The Nigerian government explicitly requested foreign assistance in its space 
program’s foundational years and every project has relied on both foreign technology 
transfer and launch capacity to varying extents, which indicates that there were ample 
opportunities for foreign influence. Despite these opportunities, however, evidence of 
foreign space partnerships reveals that foreign partners only weakly influenced the 
direction of the space program. Critically, Nigerian domestic space actors likely provided 
the initial motivation for cornerstone space policy decisions, even if foreign partners made 
achieving space objectives possible. Support for this hypothesis moves from “no support” 
to “weak” simply because it is possible, but not certain, that space security assistance from 
the U.S. indirectly spurred Nigerian politicians and bureaucrats to develop space 
institutions and technology that better supported domestic security objectives. Still, even if 
there was clear evidence to affirm the U.S. security assistance example, it would not 
explain Nigeria’s push for development in the 1990s and 2000s, or the slow acceptance of 
potential security applications in the early 2010s.  
2. Domestic Political Prioritization 
The main prediction of the domestic political prioritization hypothesis is that 
Nigeria’s broad domestic political priorities from the 1990s to the 2010s initially directed 
Nigeria’s space program toward development, before shifting to include security-focused 
objectives in the 2010s. Analysis of this hypothesis is divided into two parts. First, this 
section explores Nigeria’s recent political history to understand how well it aligned with 
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the space program’s trajectory. Second, I examine evidence of corruption and clientelism 
in Nigeria’s space program to determine if Nigerian politicians used the space program to 
advance private political goals.  
From 1984 to 1999, Nigeria was ruled by three military regimes that attempted to 
reform, with limited success, a struggling Nigerian economy stressed by a global economic 
recession and widespread corruption.310 Muhammadu Buhari, the first military leader in 
this period of Nigeria's history who held power from 1984 to 1985, tried to advance 
Nigeria’s economy by instilling “discipline”—referring to reform efforts like the War 
Against Indiscipline that aimed to end corruption—in order to support continued economic 
austerity measures and attract foreign investment.311 General Ibrahim Babangida 
overthrew Buhari in 1985 after it became clear that Buhari’s discipline reforms did not 
properly address Nigeria’s structural economic challenges.312 In 1986, Babangida 
launched a structural adjustment program (SAP) in Nigeria, which rejected International 
Monetary Fund financial support, but still contained a series of economic reforms like 
budget restrictions, privatization, and trade liberalization.313 Nigeria’s SAP produced 
mixed economic results; debt rescheduling and agricultural production growth benefited 
Nigeria’s economy, while inflation, unemployment, and declining real income all created 
economic hardship.314 Babangida also tried to transition to a civilian democracy in 
response to civil societal pressure, but Babangida invalidated the 1993 election results, and 
Nigeria instead continued with military rule until 1999.315 General Sani Abacha, Nigeria’s 
third military leader after the failed democratic transition in 1993, focused generally on 
consolidating his personal power and reversing economic policies in an attempt to create 
                                                 
310 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 209. 
311 Falola and Heaton, 212–14. 
312 Falola and Heaton, 216; and Peter Lewis, Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in 
Indonesia and Nigeria (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 161–62. 
313 Lewis, Growing Apart, 162. 
314 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 218–20; and Lewis, Growing Apart, 163–64. 
315 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 209, 211, 227. 
82 
growth.316 Specifically, Abacha undermined existing political institutions, imprisoned 
political opponents, and oscillated between removing and reinstituting many SAP reforms, 
which produced economic stagnation.317  
During this period of military rule, Nigeria’s space activity was limited to 
establishing and implementing plans for NCRS in 1988 and 1995, respectively. Although 
limited, NCRS’s mission—using remote sensing technology to assist the development and 
management of Nigeria’s natural resources like oil—fully supported the economic focus 
of Nigeria’s military leaders who were extremely reliant on revenue and personal rents 
derived from Nigeria’s oil sector.318 Furthermore, Babangida’s second-in-command 
personally discussed Nigeria’s development-focused space ambitions with the United 
Nations in 1987, just one year before the government approved NCRS, which indicates 
that the early space program’s objectives were, at least to some extent, advanced from the 
highest levels of government.319 
A democratic election in 1999 made Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military head of 
state who transitioned to civilian politics, Nigeria’s first president in the Fourth 
Republic.320 Like the military dictators before him, Obasanjo focused primarily on 
economic reform, but his programs were more successful in arresting Nigeria’s economic 
freefall over the next eight years.321 Specifically, Obasanjo’s economic policies included 
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an anti-corruption campaign, debt restructuring, attracting foreign investments, and 
supporting Nigerian industry with an emphasis on telecommunications.322 Given the 
previous 15 years of economic challenges, it is not surprising that Obasanjo’s primary 
objective was improving socioeconomic development.  
Obasanjo also focused on reducing the Nigerian military’s political power and 
instituting military reforms geared toward reducing the risk of another coup. For example, 
Obasanjo “retired all military officer [s] that had held political appointments in the country 
between 1984 and 1999…[and] brought to trial some top military officers.”323 
Additionally, Nigeria’s new democratic constitution, enacted in 1999, explicitly subjugated 
the military to the power of civilian political leaders.324 Finally, Obasanjo hired a U.S. 
contractor to guide Nigeria’s military reforms, despite strong resistance from military 
leaders.325 Notably, Obasanjo’s military reform efforts did not include prioritizing the 
Nigerian military’s training or equipment, which continued to be outdated and poorly 
maintained.326 This evidence illustrates that Obasanjo’s security priorities entirely focused 
on establishing civilian control over military forces, rather than appeasing possible military 
political opponents. Overall, the transition to democratic rule under Obasanjo broadly 
prioritized socioeconomic development, with significant efforts to reduce military power.  
High-level politicians in the Obasanjo administration primarily pushed Nigeria’s 
space program to adopt development-focused objectives through NASRDA, the National 
Space Policy, NigeriaSat-1, and NigComSat-1. For example, when Vice President Atiku 
Abubakar requested foreign support for NASRDA in 2000, he argued that developing 
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countries like Nigeria could not obtain sustainable development without access to space 
technology.327 Similarly, Obasanjo illuminated the National Space Policy by commenting 
that space technology would support his development objectives by helping to exploit 
Nigeria’s natural resources and improve telecommunications infrastructure.328 
NigeriaSat-1, whose launch Obasanjo personally observed, began to fulfill the objective of 
exploiting natural resources by using remote sensing to monitor agriculture, water, and oil 
pipelines.329 Furthermore, the director of NASRDA, Robert Boroffice, revealed in 2004 
that Obasanjo instructed NASRDA to deliver a fully operational NigComSat-1 to orbit by 
2006 to support sustainable development with “a broad array of communication needs in 
the areas of telephony, broadcasting, broadband and Internet services.”330 These 
comments provide clear evidence that Obasanjo and other high-level politicians were 
directly involved in guiding the space program to meet development goals between 1999 
and 2007.  
President Obasanjo picked Umaru Yar’Adua to succeed him as the leader of the 
People’s Democratic Party, and, after winning the 2007 elections, Yar’Adua became the 
                                                 
327 Adi Jr., “Nigeria: Atiku Wants Greater Co-Operation on Transfer of Expertise.” 




















Fourth Republic’s second president until his death in 2010.331 Yar’Adua’s poor health, in 
combination with internal competition for power in the People’s Democratic Party, 
generally impeded his ability to effectively enact policies.332 Upon winning the election 
in 2007, however, Yar’Adua described his administration’s objectives in a seven-point 
agenda.333 Yar’Adua’s agenda established seven goals—energy infrastructure, 
agricultural production, economic diversification, transportation infrastructure, property 
rights, Niger Delta security, and education—for his administration to focus on in order to 
advance Nigeria’s socioeconomic development.334 In this sense, Yar’Adua broadly 
favored development objectives, while also recognizing the economic value of Nigerian 
security. 
Given Yar’Adua’s relatively short presidency, his administration’s space 
accomplishments were limited primarily to applying NigComSat-1 towards new political 
priorities in the seven-point agenda. NigComSat-1 was particularly useful in supporting 
economic diversification until it failed in orbit in 2008. After the Obasanjo administration 
oversaw the launch of NigComSat-1, Yar’Adua received the satellite from China once 
CGWIC delivered it to GEO, commenting that “this [NigComSat-1] will in turn create a 
visible multiplier effect on other sectors of the economy.”335 Beyond the spillover effects 
that Yar’Adua highlighted, NigComSat-1 itself created economic diversification by 
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providing a new revenue stream for the federal government. Shortly after launching, 
NigComSat-1 attracted a series of bandwidth leasing agreements from companies in the 
U.S., Europe, Nigeria, China, Kenya, Rwanda, and one deal worth $250 million from a 
Middle East-based company.336 Thus, it is clear that Yar’Adua considered the 
communications satellite as vehicle for economic diversification under his seven-point 
agenda, and the space program executed on making Yar’Adua’s development objective a 
reality.  
Yar’Adua’s vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, became president after Yar’Adua 
died in 2010, holding the presidency until 2015.337 Much like his predecessors, President 
Jonathan largely favored socioeconomic policies, but a growth in regional terrorist activity 
caused Jonathan to also begin focusing on Nigeria’s security challenges. The 
Transformation Agenda became Nigeria’s cornerstone socioeconomic policy during the 
Jonathan presidency, aspiring to place Nigeria in the top 20 global economies by 2020 
through an anti-corruption campaign, job creation, and diversified economic growth.338 In 
addition to the Transformation Agenda, however, Jonathan had to address the security 
challenges posed by Boko Haram, which had been expanding in northeast Nigeria since 
2009.339 During his presidency, Jonathan took a series of initial, and largely unsuccessful 
steps to contain Boko Haram’s expansion, which included granting Nigeria’s military and 
State Security Service emergency powers, increasing security presence in northern Nigeria, 
improving security infrastructure, and advancing security-focused human capital.340  
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Aligning with his broader political objectives, Jonathan used NigeriaSat-2, 
NigeriaSat-X, NigComSat-1R, and the National Space Council to support his 
Transformation Agenda and national security efforts. When Russia launched NigeriaSat-2 
and NigeriaSat-X in 2011, Jonathan publicly offered congratulations to NASRDA and 
stated that “we will continue to emphasize investment in science and technology as a tool 
to drive the transformation agenda of this Administration.”341 Just a few months later, 
NigComSat-1R’s launch prompted Jonathan to remark that the satellite would contribute to 
a range of applications to support the Transformation Agenda, like economic 
diversification and job creation, while also benefiting national security.342  In fact, 
Jonathan was so invested in using space technology to advance his policies that he directed 
all government institutions to begin utilizing NigComSat-1R for communication.343 
Finally, when Jonathan established the National Space Council in 2013, with himself as 
the chair, he explained that “given the critical place of space technology in national 
security, communication, industrialisation and sustained socio-economic development, the 
need to properly structure and drive the national space programme could not be over-
emphasised.”344 In other words, the space program was a critical component of Jonathan’s 
broader political priorities.  
Muhammadu Buhari, who served as the country’s military dictator from 1984 to 
1985, won the 2015 presidential election by exploiting  Jonathan’s failure to contain Boko 
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Haram’s expansion in 2014 and promising to end corruption.345 As such, it is no surprise 
that the Buhari administration has increasingly prioritized Nigeria’s security since 2015, 
committing additional resources toward counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram 
and assisting regional counterterrorism operations.346 More specifically, Buhari moved the 
military’s headquarters closer to Boko Haram’s operations in northern Nigeria and replaced 
the highest-ranking leaders in Nigeria’s military and intelligence forces.347 Furthermore, 
much like his economic policies as a military head of state in the 1980s, it is clear that 
Buhari viewed corruption as Nigeria’s primary economic challenge.348 To address this 
obstacle, Buhari focused on generating corruption convictions through the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and recovering state resources that were stolen 
through corruption.349 In fact, between 2015 and 2018, the EFCC recovered $1.4 billion 
and doubled “the rate of convictions secured by the EFCC under Jonathan.”350 Overall, 
Buhari executed a significant shift to a security focus in 2015, while still enacting policies 
designed to address socioeconomic development obstacles.  
Buhari primarily used Nigeria’s space technology to help address national security 
challenges. For example, Buhari’s efforts to professionalize the military have directly 
motivated funding for DSA since 2015.351 More specifically, Buhari’s administration used 
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satellite imagery to monitor adversary forces throughout the country and began testing 
rockets for defense applications.352 Finally, the chairman of the House Committee on 
Defence, Jimi Benson, illuminated the political importance of space technologies with 
security applications when he commented that the DSA’s efforts helped to improve the 
military’s effectiveness.353 
The second aspect of this hypothesis is the use of state resources to accomplish 
private political goals. In Nigeria, this usually takes the form of clientelism or corruption, 
both of which are ubiquitous in Nigeria’s institutions. For example, Transparency 
International, in its corruption perceptions index, ranked Nigeria 98th out of 99 countries—
meaning Nigeria was the second most corrupt country—when Obasanjo became president 
in 1999, 147th of 180 when Yar’Adua took office in 2007, 143rd of 178 when Jonathan 
replaced Yar’Adua in 2010, and 136th of 198 when Buhari won the 2015 election.354 
Although Nigeria’s relative position on the index has slowly improved over two decades, 
Nigeria is continuously one of the most corrupt countries in the world. More importantly, 
Nigeria’s corruption has persisted despite multiple anti-corruption campaigns and 
programs since 1975.355 In fact, every civilian president since 1999, with the exception of 
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Yar’Adua, has been accused of corruption despite implementing anti-corruption 
policies.356 
It is possible that Nigeria’s rampant political corruption and clientelism have spread 
to the space program. A review of NIGCOMSAT’s financial records yielded several 
anomalies, which brought NIGCOMSAT’s practices into question.357 The Nigerian 
government recently announced an investigation into NIGCOMSAT’s activities since its 
inception in 2006 because of concerns over “alleged sleaze, misappropriation and non-
profitability.”358 In regards to corruption, the audit will investigate allegations of bribery 
and contract scams worth 8 billion naira.359 Beyond these allegations, however, direct 
evidence of corruption in Nigeria’s space program does not presently exist. Notably, some 
of Nigeria’s space institutions, like the National Space Council, implement anti-corruption 
policies that stop officials convicted of corruption from holding office; however, corruption 
convictions are historically uncommon, especially prior to the Buhari administration.360 It 
is likely that many corrupt officials do not face legal consequences for their corrupt 
practices. Thus, these anti-corruption policies are likely somewhat ineffective at preventing 
corruption in Nigeria’s space program. While these examples provide some signs of 
potential corruption, there is not enough evidence to determine how extensively Nigeria’s 
broad political corruption has infiltrated the space program. More importantly, the lack of 
evidence prevents an effective analysis of corruption’s influence on the space program’s 
security-development decisions.  
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In summary, evidence of Nigeria’s domestic political priorities strongly supports 
this hypothesis. The objectives, institutions, and technology of Nigeria’s space program 
have consistently supported the government’s broader domestic priorities. Since 1984, 
Nigeria’s military regimes and democratic administrations have all focused primarily on 
economic reform and socioeconomic development, until the rise and expansion of Boko 
Haram after Yar’Adua’s presidency. Increasing terrorist activity forced the government to 
include security objectives alongside development priorities in the 2010s. Nigeria’s space 
history reveals that the space program’s priorities almost perfectly matched this timeline. 
Furthermore, it is clear that political corruption and clientelism are common in Nigeria’s 
government, and have possibly spread to the space program, but the extent and effects of 
this influence on the space program are less apparent. Regardless, the domestic political 
priorities hypothesis finds strong support in aggregate. 
3. Bureaucratic Institutions 
The central concept of this hypothesis is as follows: some domestic bureaucratic 
institutions are more powerful than others, and, in the process of implementing government 
policy, powerful institutions can guide the objectives of policies or programs to match 
institutional interests. Specifically, this section considers bureaucratic power and influence 
during the space program’s formative and security transition years in the late 1990s and 
early 2010s, respectively. During these two periods, the space program’s internal 
institutional inertia either did not exist, or was previously directed almost exclusively 
towards development objectives, suggesting that factors external to the space bureaucracy 
altered the security-development course.  
Given the institutional-level dynamics that still strongly favored Nigeria’s military 
during the period of democratic transition, this hypothesis predicts that the nascent space 
program would emerge with a security bias. Yet, in 1999, government officials established 
NASRDA with a near-complete focus on socioeconomic development. This inconsistency, 
however, may be at least partially explained by evidence of bureaucratic influence both 
during and after Nigeria’s military regimes. Dibie, for example, uses interviews with 
Nigerian officials to determine that the military’s colonial legacy of inefficiency allowed a 
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powerful, yet corrupt Nigerian bureaucracy to shape policy even at the height of military 
political power in the 1990s.361 Similarly, Omotoso illustrates how bureaucratic 
institutions have continued to mold policies by delaying implementation of a policy or 
issuing government circulars to directly change a policy.362 Omotoso also shows that 
bureaucratic and personal interests have caused bureaucratic institutions to compete against 
one another for resources and influence.363 Thus, throughout Nigeria’s space history, 
bureaucratic institutions have exerted a powerful influence over Nigeria’s policy process 
in general. For this hypothesis to be supported, however, general bureaucratic interest and 
influence in public policy must also extend to the space sector more specifically.  
Despite the strength of bureaucratic power in Nigeria’s general policy process, 
several space milestones reveal that bureaucratic institutions typically implement existing 
space policy, rather than driving the policy-level trajectory of the space program. In 2001, 
the director of NASRDA, Robert Boroffice, disclosed that the Nigerian space program 
planned to closely implement the space policy guidelines that the Federal Executive 
Council—a political institution chaired by the Nigerian president—established through the 
National Space Policy.364 In implementing the political vision captured by the National 
Space Policy, bureaucrats occasionally suggested additional uses for specific space 
technology, but these expanded applications received political approval and continued 
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supporting broader political priorities. After the launch of NigComSat-1 in 2007, for 
example, Boroffice approached President Obasanjo for approval to pursue additional 
communications licenses through the Nigerian Communication Commission to fully 
exploit the satellite’s capabilities.365 Similarly, after the launch of NigeriaSat-2 and 
NigeriaSat-X in 2011, the director of NASRDA, Seidu Mohammed, offered detailed 
examples of how these two imagery satellites would help to meet the development goals 
under Jonathan’s Transformation Agenda by 2020.366 Finally, both the director of 
NIGCOMSAT, Ahmed-Rufai, and Minister of Communications Omobola Johnson 
described a range of technology applications for NigComSat-1R that would directly support 
the Transformation Agenda after the satellite launched in 2011.367 These examples 
demonstrate that space bureaucrats publicly acknowledged the space program’s politically-
driven objectives, implemented technology applications that supported political agendas, 
and requested political approval to pursue additional functions. In other words, space 
bureaucrats generally stayed within the bounds of policy direction handed down by 
politicians.  
Even in the following example, where it appears that NIGCOMSAT attempted to 
exert bureaucratic control of the communications component of the space program, the 
evidence demonstrates that politicians remained in control. In 2010, the Committee on 
Science and Technology in the Nigerian House of Representatives took notice of an 
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ongoing dispute between NIGCOMSAT and NASRDA, in which NIGCOMSAT argued 
that it was institutionally independent from NASRDA, rather than its subsidiary.368 The 
fighting peaked in 2011, when NIGCOMSAT stopped NASRDA engineers from accessing 
the command ground station for NigComSat-1R by erecting a physical barrier, even though 
NASRDA was supposed to take control of the satellite.369 By 2012, the Nigerian 
government moved responsibility for NIGCOMSAT from the Ministry of Science and 
Technology to the Ministry of Communications.370 The federal government’s decision to 
transfer NIGCOMSAT to the Ministry of Communications in response to bureaucratic 
jockeying illustrated political control over the space program.  
Once the Ministry of Communications became responsible for NIGCOMSAT, 
however, there were additional attempts to use bureaucratic interest to influence Nigeria’s 
space program. In 2017, the Nigerian Senate rejected the Minister of Communications’ 
demands for additional communications satellites, questioning if satellite acquisition was 
the best use of scarce government revenue to support socioeconomic development.371 The 
Senate’s concerns centered on budgetary constraints after a recession, considering that the 
satellites would require a $550 million loan from China’s Exim Bank.372 Then, in 2018, 
the Minister of Communications, Alhaji Adebayo Shittu, sold almost half of 
NIGCOMSAT’s equity, worth approximately $550 million, to Chinese investors to 
purchase the two additional communications satellites.373 Although this action seemingly 
suggested that bureaucratic interest was able to overpower the Senate’s concerns, Shittu 
actually addressed the financial concerns by renegotiating the satellites’ contract so the 
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Nigerian government would not need to provide any funding, and Shittu received Buhari’s 
approval before finalizing the contract.374 Shittu, a career politician himself, was driving 
the Ministry of Communications’ bureaucratic interests, and he needed to ameliorate 
political concerns at multiple levels across the federal government before proceeding with 
the deal. Put simply, political priorities once again constrained bureaucratic interests. 
In total, the existing evidence offers only weak support for the bureaucratic 
institutions hypothesis. Broadly, Nigeria’s bureaucratic institutions have historically been 
influential in guiding policy. Furthermore, there has been extensive bureaucratic interest in 
the space program since at least the 2000s. Despite this interest, however, multiple 
examples reveal that the bureaucracy generally follows the space policy set by politicians. 
In this sense, bureaucratic institutions have the power to implement existing space policy 
in Nigeria, and even expand upon existing space technology applications, which offers 
limited support to this hypothesis. Regardless, there is no evidence that bureaucratic 
institutions have guided space policy away from political priorities or been the underlying 
force behind the political priorities that steer space policy.  
4. Economic Capacity 
The economic capacity hypothesis predicts that low levels of economic capacity 
will (1) force a government to reduce space program funding; (2) consequently pressure 
officials to pick either a security- or development-focused space program, since available 
resources prevent the simultaneous pursuit of both options; and (3) provide incentives for 
a development-focused space program that could boost the country’s overall economic 
capacity, thereby relieving economic pressure. This section first investigates how reduced 
economic capacity impacts Nigeria’s space program funding. Then, I examine how funding 
constraints have affected Nigeria’s space program, looking for evidence that reduced 
funding repeatedly helps explain the space program’s trajectory.  
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Nigeria’s economy became the largest in Africa when, in 2012, Nigeria’s GDP 
surpassed South Africa’s after multiple years of economic competition between the two 
countries.375 As a single indicator, Nigeria’s GDP suggests a relatively high level of 
economic capacity, but the government’s dependence on oil diminishes its ability to 
capitalize on the expanding size of Nigeria’s economy. Specifically, oil accounts for 
approximately half of Nigeria’s government revenue, and decades of dependence on oil 
revenue have facilitated an extremely weak non-oil tax revenue base.376 Oil dependence 
effectively reduces Nigeria’s domestic economic capacity, because oil exports are largely 
dependent on global prices and demand. Thus, Nigeria’s capacity to employ its large 
economy towards a government objective, like the space program, is directly related to the 
price of oil unless foreign loans are available for specific government projects. Endemic 
corruption further undermines Nigeria’s economic capacity, as already limited state 
resources are siphoned into personal accounts.377 As such, Nigeria’s economic capacity is 
far lower than its GDP would suggest. 
From 1999 to 2015, Nigeria’s economy exhibited strong growth, but still faced 
several important constraints. Specifically, Nigeria’s GDP increased by 2.1% per year on 
average from 1995 to 1999, over 6% per year on average from 2000 to 2014, and 2.6% in 
2015.378 Regardless of the strong growth from 1999 to 2015, however, inflation was 
persistently high—above average GDP growth for the same period—while the 
unemployment rate grew “at a compound annual average of 4.8 percent” from 2000 to 
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2014.379 Put simply, more Nigerians struggled to find work and the naira lost substantial 
value, despite an expanding economy. Of critical significance to this hypothesis, Nigeria’s 
government expenditures also suffered during this period. In 1999, total government 
expenditures peaked at almost 18% of GDP before dropping precipitously to just 6.8% in 
2006, at which point expenditures briefly increased to 8.3% by 2008, before beginning a 
steady decline to 5.3% in 2015.380 Although Nigeria did not technically encounter a 
recession between 1999 and 2015, these indicators demonstrate that Nigeria’s economic 
expansion did not necessarily translate into improved living conditions or, more 
importantly for this hypothesis, increased government funding for national objectives in 
relative terms. 
Considering the increasingly negative impacts of Nigeria’s financial challenges 
from 1999 to 2015, this hypothesis predicts that the Nigerian space program would become 
progressively more constrained by growing competition for falling government funding. 
Put differently, the Nigerian government could have established a dual-use space program 
while government funding was relatively high in 1999, but the space program would begin 
to specialize in either security or, more likely, development objectives towards the end of 
this period. Additionally, we would expect to see Nigeria’s space program contract in size 
due to decreased funding, if there were strong support for the economic capacity 
hypothesis.  
Nigeria’s space history, however, reveals a story that contrasts with these 
predictions. Although Nigeria established NASRDA in 1999, the government did not 
provide funding to NASRDA for two years—the Nigerian government allocated $93 
million to NASRDA in 2001.381 By 2001, government expenditure had already dropped 
from 18% to 12.5% of GDP, and the investment in NASRDA represented over 1% of total 
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expenditure for the year.382 In other words, the Nigerian government made an extremely 
significant investment in their space program despite a recent contraction in relative 
government spending. The subsequent investments in satellites demonstrated a 
commitment to expand the space program, even though relative government spending 
steadily decreased between 1999 and 2015. Nigeria spent $13 million on NigeriaSat-1 in 
2003, $300 million—only $51 million was required up front—on NigComSat-1 in 2007, 
and $112 million combined on NigeriaSat-2 and NigeriaSat-X in 2011.383 More important 
than the expanding size of Nigeria’s space program, however, is that the space program 
shifted from mostly development-focused objectives throughout the 2000s to include 
explicit security-focused objectives in the 2010s. Instead of specializing in either security 
or development, Nigeria’s space program expanded in both size and scope during this 
period of economic challenges, which directly contradicts this hypothesis. 
Nigeria’s economic challenges only worsened after 2015. In 2016, Nigeria’s 
economy contracted for the first time in 25 years, which created the Fourth Republic’s first 
defined recession.384 As expected, the precipitous decline in oil prices at least partially 
caused Nigeria’s 2016 economic crisis, and also reduced total government revenues by 
33% from their 2014 peak.385 Fortunately, the 2016 recession was short, ending in 2017, 
as Nigeria’s economy recovered alongside oil prices.386 The 2016 economic recession 
reduced the government’s overall economic capacity, which, this hypothesis predicts, 
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indicates that Nigeria’s space funding should have similarly declined during the same 
period.  
Despite the predictions of this hypothesis, Nigeria’s space program funding 
significantly increased during the 2016 economic recession. In 2015, one year before 
Nigeria’s economic recession, the Nigerian government allocated over 9 billion naira to 
the space program, with 2.75 billion naira to NIGCOMSAT under the Ministry of 
Communications and 6.27 billion naira to NASRDA and its associated research centers 
under the Ministry of Science and Technology.387 Then, during the 2016 recession, the 
Nigerian government increased total funding to the space program by 47% with 3.45 billion 
naira to NIGCOMSAT, 7.88 billion naira to NASRDA and its research centers, and 1.96 
billion naira to the nascent DSA under the Ministry of Defence, for a total of almost 13.3 
billion naira to the entire space program.388 As the recession ended in 2017, the space 
program’s funding once again increased by over 25% to a total of almost 16.7 billion naira, 
with 3.91 billion naira to NIGCOMSAT, 10.81 billion naira to NASRDA and its research 
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centers, and 1.96 billion naira to DSA.389 These increases in space funding considerably 
outpaced inflation in Nigeria—9.5% in 2016 and 11.1% in 2017—which means that 
Nigeria’s space funding experienced a real increase during the 2016 recession.390 Thus, it 
is clear that Nigeria’s space funding growth during the Fourth Republic’s only defined 
recession undermines the first prediction of the economic capacity hypothesis. 
In addition to the increase in total space funding during a period of reduced 
economic capacity, the Nigerian government also chose to diversify the space program’s 
objectives at the same time. The government’s decision to establish DSA in 2014 was the 
most explicit indication of the space program’s shift to security in the 2010s, ultimately 
leading to a position near the middle of the security-development spectrum. Notable to this 
hypothesis, however, DSA did not actually receive funding until 2016, despite its formation 
two years earlier.391 Contrary to the prediction that reduced economic capacity would 
force government officials to pick between security or development, this timeline 
illustrates that Nigeria’s space program expanded, as measured by funding, to include both 
security and development objectives during the 2016 economic recession. As such, the 
DSA’s funding timeline effectively refutes the second aspect of this hypothesis.  
The third prediction of this hypothesis asserts that lower economic capacity 
incentivizes development objectives because development-oriented programs may create 
economic benefits. Put differently, economic constraints should negatively impact 
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security-focused space program funding more than funding that supports development 
objectives. Even with increasing total space program funding from 2015 to 2017, many 
space program actors and scholars repeatedly cite funding as a restraining force on the 
space program’s goals. In fact, in 2017, NASRDA had an extremely low level of funding 
when compared to more advanced and near-peer international space agencies.392 Tella, for 
example, cites Nigeria’s recession as an obstacle to Nigeria’s 25-year space roadmap.393 
Similarly, Okon explains that funding challenges inhibit domestic satellite manufacturing 
capacity and communications satellite procurement.394 Finally, an engineer at CSTP stated 
that Nigeria’s launch program has progressed slowly because the Nigerian government did 
not provide enough funding due to a lack of launch technology prioritization.395  
These accounts illustrate the perception that funding constraints affected all aspects 
of Nigeria’s space program during the 2016 recession, including both development-
focused activities like space exploration and security-focused launch capacity. There is 
only limited evidence that suggests that government officials marginally favored funding 
for development objectives during this time. Namely, allocated funding to DSA remained 
constant from 2016 to 2017, while overall funding for the space program increased by over 
25% during the same period. Considering that the Nigerian government established DSA 
in 2016, however, this minimal evidence is insufficient to support the third prediction of 
the economic capacity hypothesis.  
Overall, the existing evidence powerfully contradicts this final hypothesis. Between 
1999 and 2015 an expanding economy could not prevent the relative decline of Nigeria’s 
government spending. Despite this decline, Nigeria’s space program expanded both in the 
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number of satellites and scope of policy objectives. More significantly, total space funding 
increased during Nigeria’s only defined economic recession in its space history. Space 
funding also expanded in scope in 2016, growing to support both security and development 
objectives. Despite the real growth in space funding’s size and scope during the 2016 
recession, a common perception existed that inadequate funding limited both development 
and security space objectives. Still, it is not clear if the perceived funding constraints were 
stronger for either security- or development-oriented projects. Considering these 
conclusions, there is no support for the economic capacity hypothesis.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated how Nigeria’s space program initially focused 
almost entirely on socioeconomic development in the 1990s but later shifted to include 
security objectives in the 2010s, which positions the current Nigerian space program in the 
middle of the security-development spectrum. Based on the analysis of all four hypotheses, 
it is apparent that Nigeria’s space trajectory has primarily been a consequence of the 
government’s political prioritization. While it is still possible that international, 
bureaucratic, or economic factors marginally influence Nigeria’s space program, the 
existing evidence offers either weak or no support for these other hypotheses. Table 3 
summarizes the level of support and key findings for each hypothesis.  
Table 3. Summary of Hypotheses for Nigeria’s Space Program 
Hypothesis Level of Support Key Findings 
Foreign Partnerships Weak 
Many opportunities for foreign 
influence, but little impact on space 
program’s path 
Political Prioritization Strong Space program’s objectives repeatedly support Nigeria’s political priorities 
Bureaucratic Institutions Weak 
Bureaucratic interest in space was 
present, but not the primary driver of 
space policy 
Economic Capacity No Support Space funding grew in size and scope during the 2016 recession 
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The next chapter concludes this research by comparing the South African and 
Nigerian case studies and summarizing the combined findings. Additionally, I examine the 
implications of the key findings, specifically discussing the broader significance of this 
research and making policy recommendations. Finally, the next chapter suggests areas for 
future research in order to advance our understanding of the decisions that EMSAs in sub-
Saharan Africa make.  
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IV. KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This concluding chapter analyzes the combined case study findings, explains how 
the findings have advanced the understanding of African space programs, discusses what 
the results indicate for the future of African space ambitions, offers three policy 
recommendations, and highlights areas for future research. Crucially, I note that the 
combination of Africa’s expanding space capabilities and the political importance of space 
programs in Africa provide a pivotal opportunity for the U.S. to improve strategically 
important geopolitical relationships on the continent. As the world’s most advanced space 
faring country, the U.S. could use space cooperation with African countries to uniquely 
counter Chinese and Russian efforts to increase geopolitical influence in Africa.  
A. COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS 
This research sought to discover why EMSAs in sub-Saharan Africa establish space 
programs with objectives that focus on national security, socioeconomic development, or 
some mixture of the two. Despite many differences in South Africa’s and Nigeria’s space 
programs, the results in the two cases are remarkably similar. Of the four hypotheses—
foreign partnerships, political prioritization, bureaucratic institutions, and economic 
capacity—only the political prioritization hypothesis has strong support in both cases. 
Conversely, the remaining three hypotheses have either weak or no support. Table 4 
summarizes the combined findings. This section compares the results of both case studies 
for each hypothesis individually.  
Table 4. Strength of Hypotheses in South Africa and Nigeria 
Hypothesis Level of Support: South Africa 
Level of Support: 
Nigeria 
Foreign Partnerships No Support Weak 
Political Prioritization Strong Strong 
Bureaucratic Institutions Weak Weak 
Economic Capacity No Support No Support 
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The first hypothesis, foreign security and development partnerships has no support 
in South Africa and only weak support in Nigeria. Put differently, Nigeria’s space program 
has been slightly more susceptible to foreign influence than South Africa’s, but its level of 
foreign influence is still low. Among African countries, South Africa has exceptional 
domestic satellite development capacity and a multitude of international partners, both of 
which have prevented foreign influence by reducing South Africa’s reliance on foreign 
space technology early and providing a competitive market of launch options to access 
space. Additionally, South Africa largely provides domestic funding for satellite 
development and launch costs, which further reduces opportunities for foreign influence. 
Nigeria’s space program, by contrast, has only recently begun to reduce its reliance 
on foreign space partners by taking ownership of satellite development and exploring 
launch technology. Nigeria has relied on foreign actors, especially China, for much of the 
funding for its satellite programs. This dynamic of long-term reliance on foreign funding 
and space technology in Nigeria has possibly shaped the trajectory of its program. 
Furthermore, Nigeria adopted security-focused objectives in the 2010s, when U.S. satellite 
imagery support for a terrorist kidnapping incident revealed the Nigerian space program’s 
weakness in security applications. Still, Nigerian domestic actors have generally directed 
the space program’s objectives with only limited foreign influence. Although foreign 
influence on African space programs is generally marginal, these results suggest that higher 
levels of space dependency increase the potential that foreign actors influence the trajectory 
of African space programs.  
Second, the evidence in both case studies strongly supports the political 
prioritization hypothesis. South Africa’s and Nigeria’s space program objectives have 
consistently aligned with and directly supported broader domestic political priorities 
throughout their space histories. Only the political prioritization hypothesis can 
meaningfully explain the trajectory of both South Africa’s and Nigeria’s space programs 
and, more importantly, the specific timing of shifts in space program objectives. In South 
Africa, for example, the post-apartheid government established a powerful development 
agenda in the 1990s and 2000s that sparked a related push for development-focused space 
applications in the contemporary space program’s formative years. Similarly, since the 
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1980s, the trajectory of Nigeria’s space program matched the government’s broad focus on 
socioeconomic development. Rising terrorist threats inspired a shift to develop a significant 
security agenda in addition to continued development efforts in the 2010s. Put simply, both 
space programs acted as one component of their respective governments’ broader political 
agendas. The strength of the political prioritization hypothesis indicates that African 
governments maintain a high-degree of agency in directing their space programs, which 
thereby limits the influence of other space stakeholders. 
Furthermore, while it is possible that political corruption and clientelism have also 
infected the space programs in South Africa and Nigeria, their impact seems limited. There 
are only a few reports of investigations into missing resources or politically-driven 
resourcing decisions in both space programs, which suggests that neither corruption nor 
clientelism are widespread in either case study. More importantly, the limited examples of 
potential corruption or clientelism do not appear to influence the trajectory of either space 
programs’ policies. Thus, even if widespread political corruption or clientelism were well-
shrouded in South Africa’s or Nigeria’s space program, there is no evidence that either 
practice guides the larger focus on security or development in African space programs.  
Third, the bureaucratic institutions hypothesis has only weak support in both case 
studies. In South Africa, development-oriented institutions like the DST and DTI had the 
opportunity to establish the contemporary space program without significant interest from 
security-sector bureaucrats. More importantly, however, South African government 
officials deliberately created strong institutions with the explicit purpose of preventing 
bureaucratic influence early in the space program’s formative years. Nigeria’s space 
history, in comparison, includes clear examples of bureaucratic competition and interest in 
controlling specific elements of the space program, like communications satellites. Still, 
despite clear bureaucratic competition within the Nigerian space program, bureaucratic 
decision makers openly demonstrate their support for political priorities by providing 
detailed plans for space technology applications that directly contribute to political 
agendas. Thus, in Nigeria, space program bureaucrats broadly follow the country’s political 
priorities, but they compete for resources and influence within the general bounds set by 
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politicians. It is interesting that two entirely different mechanisms—formal institutions and 
political pressure—yield the same result: weak support for this hypothesis. 
Finally, neither case study provides support to the fourth hypothesis, economic 
capacity. This hypothesis predicts that economic incentives, specifically periods of 
economic restraint, guide a space program’s security-development decisions, rather than 
specific actors like politicians or bureaucrats. In both South Africa and Nigeria, periods of 
reduced economic capacity—recessions or commodity price declines—were not frequent 
enough to account for long-term space policy decisions, and did not always align with 
pivotal moments in space history. More importantly, decreasing government revenue 
caused by recessions did not lead to funding shortages in either space program. In fact, 
both South Africa’s and Nigeria’s space programs maintained the same size or even grew 
during periods of economic recession. Even though politicians and bureaucrats sometimes 
argued that economic scarcity inhibited their country’s space programs, both South Africa 
and Nigeria were able to at least sustain existing space projects during periods of economic 
constraint. These findings suggest that African EMSAs place significant value on their 
space programs, refusing to allow funding concerns to meaningfully influence space policy 
objectives because of the real benefits that space technology offers developing countries. 
Put simply, space programs are worth their costs to African EMSAs. It is also revealing 
that Nigeria has arguably less economic capacity than South Africa given its continued 
reliance on oil revenues and pervasive corruption, yet only the Nigerian space program 
diversified to include security goals. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
In the introductory chapter, I offered three reasons why this research is important: 
(1) there are few studies that attempt to explain African decisions in the space sector; (2) 
the number, size, and capabilities of African space programs are rapidly growing; and (3) 
foreign space partnerships with African EMSAs may create both opportunities and threats 
to U.S. national interests. This section, in turn, explains how studying South Africa’s and 
Nigeria’s space involvement has advanced knowledge in these three areas of interest.  
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First, in seeking to understand African decisions in the space sector, this research 
clearly shows that the South African and Nigerian governments used their space programs 
as tools designed to assist domestic political objectives. This suggests that, despite 
dependence on foreign technologies and funding, African politicians and political 
institutions generally drive space decisions, and that African leaders have a high degree of 
agency and control over their space programs. While these findings align with Harding’s 
general conclusion that an EMSA’s space policies frequently reflect more terrestrial 
security and development priorities, they also illustrate several surprising discoveries in 
the African context.396 For example, previous studies demonstrate that EMSAs are 
extremely reliant on foreign partners, which provides opportunities for influence.397 For 
African EMSAs specifically, the prevalence of aid dependency, along with increased 
foreign involvement across the continent, anticipated that foreign partners could exert 
substantial influence over domestic space actors. Weak support for the foreign partnership 
hypothesis, however, suggests that opportunities for foreign influence in African EMSAs 
may be overstated, even for countries that are almost entirely reliant on international space 
assistance like Nigeria. Additionally, it is surprising that economic concerns were not a 
larger factor in limiting African space programs given the public perception that space 
programs divert scarce revenue from terrestrial programs designed to address the 
innumerable development challenges that African countries face. Instead of folding to 
public pressure, African politicians and bureaucrats continuously defended space spending 
as essential for development, frequently even championing increased space spending, 
despite relentless public critiques against the cost of space programs. In total, these findings 
reveal a high degree of political pride in African space programs, which contrasts sharply 
with the development and security challenges that are abundant in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Second, the importance of domestic political priorities in African space programs 
provides insight into how the expanding African space sector will impact the space 
environment and international space fora. Considering that every African country has 
                                                 
396 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 13. 
397 Wood and Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing Countries.” 
110 
expressed interest in establishing or developing space capacity, African countries could 
meaningfully contribute to the flood of spacecraft in the already crowded orbital 
environment in the coming decades. As of 2020, there are almost 2,800 operational 
satellites orbiting Earth, joined by over 3,000 additional defunct spacecraft and about 
15,000 catalogued pieces of debris, which totals to over 21,000 catalogued objects in 
orbit.398 Given that sub-Saharan Africa is the largest bloc of countries currently without 
satellites, the continent’s space ambitions stand to contribute hundreds of operational 
satellites and associated orbital debris to Earth’s fragile space environment in the coming 
decades.399 The importance of political priorities in Africa’s expanding space programs 
suggests that African politicians will likely continue advocating for measures that protect 
their space access rights, especially for the limited number of GEO slots, despite the risks 
that increasingly crowded orbits create.400 Put simply, African leaders want to assure their 
countries’ ability to use space as a tool to help achieve crucial political objectives for 
decades to come. If African leaders manage to add hundreds of satellites to Earth’s space 
environment despite continued resource constraints, they would meaningfully increase the 
threat of an exponential growth in orbital spacecraft and debris.401 Any “cascading” orbital 
debris crisis would effectively cut off the use of space for all countries. 
Notably, the African Union established a continental African Space Agency in 
2017, but poor funding and debates about the agency’s purpose and scope have delayed its 
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continued implementation.402 Should the African Space Agency fully materialize, it could 
reduce the potential orbital footprint of many African countries by consolidating satellite 
constellations; however, it must first overcome the significant hurdles posed by individual 
countries pushing to ensure their diverse domestic political benefits before committing to 
funding.403 Historically, African countries have cooperated in space, with multiple 
examples of mutually beneficial space institutions and satellite constellations within 
Africa. Space cooperation between African countries is likely to continue when domestic 
political goals align; however, the diversity of African political goals will almost certainly 
inspire additional unilateral space programs and may spoil international norm building 
efforts. In other words, these diverse political objectives add to the existing challenges that 
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space faces in creating new 
international space law and norms. U.S. officials interested in establishing new 
international space norms could use an African country’s domestic political priorities to 
anticipate how African EMSAs might respond to a proposal.  
Third, Africa’s foreign space partners may be able to strengthen geopolitical 
relationships by supporting African countries’ existing space objectives. It remains 
unlikely that foreign space partners could substantially influence the objectives of an 
African country’s space policy; however, they could earn political capital by providing 
space technology, satellite data, space services, human capital development, or launch 
capacity to existing programs.404 Considering that African space programs serve key 
domestic political objectives, it is likely that African leaders perceive foreign assistance in 
the space sector as a genuine effort to help African nations develop the capacity to 
overcome persistent security or development challenges. 
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Russia and China are pursuing this approach, at least to some extent. As evidenced 
by this research, China and Russia are extensively involved in the African space sector. 
Specifically, Russia has launched the most African satellites of any foreign partner, and 
Russian state-owned companies in the space industry help to bolster “geopolitical influence 
and surveillance capacity in the region.”405 Russia’s involvement with defense 
applications in South Africa’s space program, however, may backfire if South African 
leaders perceive an unwelcome Russian push for additional security programs or for more 
Russian control. Similarly, the Chinese government, which is heavily involved in African 
satellite development, typically establishes space partnerships only with African countries 
that agree to “the highest level of bilateral relations, which involve the full pursuit of 
cooperation, development, and coordination on regional and international affairs.”406 In 
other words, China uses space partnerships as one piece of a larger strategy to establish a 
strategic partnership with more general political cooperation. In these foreign space 
partnerships, African countries have thus far retained significant agency over their space 
policies, but may be open to broader political influence.  
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the U.S. has lagged behind Chinese and Russian involvement in Africa’s 
space programs over the last two decades, there remain plenty of opportunities to quickly 
reverse this trend. Space cooperation with South Africa and Nigeria, in particular, could 
strengthen U.S. relations with two strategic partners and regional leaders. Considering that 
South Africa and Nigeria will likely maintain their regional power statuses in the coming 
decades, advancing space policy cooperation with both countries may expand America’s 
geopolitical influence on the continent.407 The U.S. should increase space cooperation with 
African countries in three ways: (1) incentivize trade in satellite technology and launch 
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services between the U.S. and African partners through the Prosper Africa initiative, (2) 
offer collaborative space solutions to African and international problems, and (3) initiate a 
guest astronaut program. I discuss each in turn. 
First, and most importantly, the U.S. should foster trade between its commercial 
space industry and the African space sector. As a global leader in the space sector, U.S. 
space technology and services are poised to provide unique capabilities to African space 
programs. Trade incentives like reduced tariffs, taxes, and duties would help U.S. space 
goods and services become more competitive in the African market, thereby delivering 
meaningful benefits to African governments and businesses. Such a proposal may harm 
domestic African space producers by further increasing international competition, but 
advanced U.S. space technologies would likely fill a different niche than the emerging 
African commercial space industry can provide. More importantly, increased commercial 
competition would benefit Africa’s space consumers by providing unique goods and 
services at a cheaper price. The nascent Prosper Africa initiative already has the objectives, 
tools, and incentives in place “to substantially increase two-way trade and investment 
between the United States and Africa.”408 By simply applying Prosper Africa incentives 
to space trade specifically, and launching a small awareness campaign that targets the U.S. 
commercial space industry, the U.S. could drastically improve its involvement in African 
space programs. In return, the U.S. would increase exports to strategically important 
countries, likely strengthen diplomatic partnerships with a multitude of African countries, 
and possibly gain access to data from African satellites. Moreover, space trade could 
advance U.S. influence as it relates to GPC dynamics in Africa.  
The second policy recommendation focuses on helping African countries develop 
space capacity to ameliorate their domestic development and security challenges. When 
feasible, U.S. officials should consider collaborating with African space agencies to help 
African countries address their most pressing development and security concerns. For 
example, NASA and SANSA could sign a memorandum of understanding to share all 
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existing and future satellite data on climate change. Considering South Africa’s repeated 
water crises and relative scarcity of satellite data on climate change, SANSA would 
disproportionately benefit from such an agreement in the short-term. Despite this short-
term asymmetry, such an agreement would be incredibly cheap to implement, grant the 
U.S. access to more advanced South African satellite data in the future, limit regional 
instability associated with resource scarcity-related migration, and improve a strategically 
important bilateral relationship that counters GPC adversaries’ efforts.  
In Nigeria’s security sector, the Department of Defense could similarly initiate an 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) space program to help Nigeria better 
counter regional terrorism, even though IMET funding to Nigeria has remained around 
only $1 million since 2017.409 Supplementing NASRDA’s efforts to train the Nigerian 
military on security-related satellite applications, the U.S. could offer a short course on a 
specific topic like imagery analysis. Such an IMET program could easily scale to 
accommodate existing budgetary restrictions, and would once again provide a host of 
mutual benefits like increased pressure on regional terrorist organizations and improved 
relations with the Nigerian government. Security-focused space cooperation with Nigeria 
could further expand by accepting Nigerian military officers into the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s international space systems operations degree program. The program would help 
Nigeria’s military maximize the utility of existing space assets and inform 
recommendations for acquiring future space systems, while also strengthening bilateral 
military relationships.  
Finally, the U.S. should commence a guest astronaut program as a useful tool to 
improve bilateral relations with strategically important countries. In the late 1980s the 
Soviet Union used their “guest cosmonaut” program to bolster relationships with allied 
countries by taking select foreign nationals into orbit.410 With rapidly falling commercial 
space launch costs, the U.S. could feasibly create a similar program that allows strategically 
important allies to send their “best and brightest” to a compressed astronaut training 
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program and subsequent limited rotation on the International Space Station. Such a 
program could also include opportunities for advanced STEM education in the U.S. to help 
develop the human capital required to conduct scientific experiments in the space 
environment. Nigeria’s goal to orbit a Nigerian astronaut and strategic relationship with 
the U.S. provide a perfect initial trial run for this policy recommendation. A guest astronaut 
program could increase U.S. political influence in a country through at least two 
mechanisms. First, the guest astronaut would likely become a national hero in their home 
country—similar to John Glenn in the U.S. and Yuri Gagarin in the Soviet Union—in large 
part thanks to U.S. support. This individual may be able to use their newfound fame to 
influence the national policy process, and would likely feel some sense of debt to the United 
States. More importantly, however, a U.S. guest astronaut program would place several 
African EMSAs on the short list of countries with experienced astronauts. In other words, 
every country selected for the guest astronaut program would earn a prestigious political 
victory. This space cooperation could thus create opportunities for further cooperation 
outside of the space sector by initiating high-level discussions among each nation’s 
political elite on a variety of issues. Put simply, a guest astronaut program may allow the 
U.S. to increase its broader influence in select African countries for a relatively cheap price.  
D. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
African space programs are an understudied area of research, and thus, there are 
many unanswered questions that provide ample opportunities for future research. This 
research focused on the two largest and oldest space programs in sub-Saharan Africa, both 
of which had significant development-focused objectives. Do the results of this research 
hold for African EMSAs with newer space programs? What about African EMSAs that 
largely favor security-focused space objectives? Specifically, Angola, the DRC, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Sudan, Ghana, and Rwanda are promising candidates for this second question.411 
The South African and Nigerian case studies favored the African countries with the most 
economic capacity, which might have biased the weak results of the economic capacity 
hypothesis. As such, it would also be useful to apply this research’s framework to African 
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EMSAs with extremely low economic capacity. This framework could further expand 
beyond sub-Saharan Africa to include EMSAs spread across the globe. An expanded study 
could help explain which characteristics of an EMSA’s space policy are unique to the 
African experience. Furthermore, future studies could examine the influence of national 
and political pride as an additional hypothesis for driving African space programs. It would 
also be useful to assess how well African space programs have met their political objectives 
over time. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is critical to understand how space 
cooperation leads to broader political influence in the current GPC environment within 
Africa.  
Answers to these critical questions could motivate the U.S. to alter its foreign policy 
in Africa. Instead of focusing largely on responding to African crises with foreign aid or 
security assistance, a significant investment in African space programs might provide some 
of the requisite tools to prevent future crises in the first place. There is no illusion, however, 
that African space programs will provide a panacea to all African problems. In all 
likelihood, African space programs will simply be one key part to a broader solution for 
the continent’s socioeconomic and security challenges. Still, space cooperation can provide 
the U.S. with a crucial counterbalance to Chinese and Russian interests in Africa—one that 
focuses on optimistic opportunities rather than persistent obstacles. Africa’s growing 
population and economy create an opportune moment to seize economic and competitive 
advantages that African space programs are likely to offer. 
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